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Contextualizing Sexual Violence
Connitted During the War on Terror:
A Historical Overview of International
Accountability
By K. ALEXA KOENIG,* RYAN S. LINCOLN** & LAUREN E. GRoTH***
[A] woman in civilian clothes entered the room and the [interro-
gator] said, "Well, we'll leave you with her, maybe this will change
your mind." I kept my head down, I did not know what was going
on, I was trying not to talk to her, but she started to undress. And
while she was talking to me in English, this lasted a long time. I was
still looking down, I was not looking at her, I do not know if she
was completely naked or still in her underwear. But she started to
touch me and then after a while, after about an hour, a guard
came in and said, "Okay, it's not working, that's enough." And I
could hear the laughter of the people who were watching this from
behind the mirror .... I could hear the laughter, and this was ... a
very humiliating experience.1
Introduction
THE ABUSES PERPETRATED against detainees at Abu Ghraib,
Guantinamo, and other U.S. military sites have been extensively docu-
mented. Among the most shocking accounts have been those of de-
tainees who were the victims of sexual violence. These accounts were
startling not only for the diverse forms of violence that were employed
* B.A., University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., University of San Francisco; M.A.,
University of California, Berkeley; Ph.D. Candidate, University of California, Berkeley
School of Law.
** A.B., University of Missouri; M.T.S., Harvard Divinity School; J.D., University of
California, Berkeley School of Law.
*** B.A., Northwestern University; M.A., University of Kwazulu-Natal; J.D., University
of California, Berkeley School of Law. The authors thank participants of U.C. Berkeley's
Human Rights Center's Sexual Violence and Accountability Project for their feedback on
earlier drafts of this article, and the Editors of the University of San Francisco Law Review
for their patient and careful editing. All errors are, of course, the authors' own.
1. LAUREL E. FLETCHER ET AL., GuANTANAMo AND ITS AFrERMATH: U.S. DETENTION
AND INTERROGATION PRACTICES AND THEIR IMPACT ON FORMER DETAINEEs 44 (2008) (quot-
ing a former Guantinarno detainee).
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but for the identities of the perpetrators and the victims. That a signif-
icant number of the perpetrators were American women, while many
of the victims were men, challenged long-standing stereotypes of
Americans as the vanguard of human rights, of men as the sole perpe-
trators of sexual violence, and of women as the quintessential victims. 2
Various government and military reports have revealed both the
depth and breadth of the sexual abuse experienced by detainees in
U.S. custody. For example, a report prepared by Lt. Gen. Randall
Schmidt and Brig. Gen. John Furlow for the Department of Defense-
which investigated approximately twenty-four thousand interrogations
that took place at Guantinamo between September 2001 and July
2004-documented many sexually explicit acts perpetrated by Ameri-
can military personnel. Their findings included the following
example:
[O]n both 21 and 23 Dec [2002], a female interrogator straddled
[the detainee], without putting any weight on the detainee ...
while he was being held down by [military police officers]. During
these incidents, a female interrogator would tell the detainee
about the deaths of fellow Al-Qaeda members. During the strad-
dling, the detainee would attempt to raise and bend his legs to
prevent the interrogator from straddling him and prayed loudly.
Interrogation [records] also indicate that on 04 Dec 02, a female
interrogator began to enter the personal space of the [detainee],
touch him, and ultimately massage his back while whispering or
speaking near his ear. Throughout this event, the [detainee]
prayed, swore at the interrogator that she was going to Hell, and
attempted to get away from her.3
While the report's authors recommended that "the use of gender co-
ercion" be "withheld" from GuantAnamo personnel, the perpetrators'
supervisor admitted to having approved these approaches, and thus
no disciplinary action was recommended.4
The report's authors also found that personnel had subjected an-
other detainee to sexualized treatment, such as forcing him to wear a
woman's bra and a thong on his head; telling him his mother and
sister were whores; telling him that he was homosexual and that other
2. Celia Rumann has argued that sexual abuse committed by female interrogators at
Abu Ghraib and GuantAnamo may not have only been illegal treatment of detainees but
may have also constituted abusive and/or illegal treatment of female soldiers that violated
the Mann Act as well as various antitrafficking laws. Celia Rumann, Use of Female Interro-
gators: The Analysis of Sexualized Interrogations the Detainee Interrogation Working Group Did Not
Conduct, 21 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 273, 286-302 (2010).
3. RANDALL M. SCHMIDT & JOHN T. FuRLow, ARMY REGULATION 15-6: FINAL REPORT,
INVESTIGATIONS INTo FBI ALLEGATIONS OF DETAINEE ABUSE AT GuANTANAMO BAY, CUBA DE-
TENTION FACILuITY 16 (2005).
4. Id.
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detainees knew about this; tying a leash to his chains, leading him
around the room, and forcing him to do dog tricks; forcing him to
dance with a male interrogator; and forcing him to stand naked in
front of women for five minutes as part of a strip search.5
Some of the most shocking examples of sexual violence, however,
were detailed in a report authored by Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba in
response to the U.S. government's request that he investigate allega-
tions of detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib.6 Taguba found "amply sup-
ported evidence" of various coercive practices, including: videotaping
and photographing naked male and female detainees; forcibly arrang-
ing detainees in various sexually explicit positions for photographing;
forcing detainees to remove their clothing and keeping them naked
for several days at a time; forcing naked male detainees to wear wo-
men's underwear; forcing groups of male detainees to masturbate
themselves while being photographed and videotaped; arranging na-
ked male detainees in a pile and then jumping on them; positioning a
naked detainee on a box with a sandbag on his head and "attaching
wires to his . .. penis to simulate electric torture," placing a dog chain
or strap around a naked detainee's neck and having a female soldier
pose for a picture; and (in one case) "having sex with a female de-
tainee."7 Taguba also described "credible" evidence of guards threat-
ening male detainees with rape and "sodomizing a detainee with a
chemical light and perhaps a broom stick."8
Such abuses committed by U.S. soldiers are, unfortunately, not
without precedent. There is strong evidence that rape and sexual vio-
lence were common occurrences throughout the Vietnam War.9 Al-
though attention to this phenomenon has been relatively scarce,
several scholars have documented that rape and sexual violence were
5. Id. at 19. The report acknowledged that the "cumulative effect" of the detainee's
interrogation was "abusive and degrading." Id. at 20.
6. ANTONIO M. TAGUBA, ARTICLE 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE
BRIGADE 6-7 (2004).
7. Id. at 16-17.
8. Id. at 17.
9. See SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 96-112
(1975) (qualifying the limited record of courts-martial for rape as "practically worthless"
for gauging the actual number of rapes, and quoting a soldier who called rape an "every-
day affair"); GINA MARIE WEAVER, IDEOLOGIES OF FORGETTING: RAPE IN THE VIETNAM WAAR 35,
51 (2010) ("[Als early as 1967, eyewitnesses reported rape as an unofficial military pol-
icy."); Gary D. Solis, Military justice, Civilian Clemency: The Sentences of Marine Corps War
Crimes in South Vietnam, 10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 59, 68-69 (2000) (indicating
that the true number of American war crimes in South Vietnam "cannot be estimated").
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often part of the American military's "standard operating procedure"
during combat operations.' 0
Gary Solis researched the record of war crimes committed by U.S.
soldiers during the Vietnam War-including rape"-and reported
that cumulative findings are impossible to produce in part because
only the Army kept track of war crimes cases.12 Nor is the record of
courts-martial complete.' 3 Nevertheless, Solis did cite some statistics,
for example, finding forty-two court-martial convictions across all
branches of the military for the rape of Vietnamese civilians between
1965 and 1973.14 However, this apparently represented only a small
fraction of the sexual violence that actually occurred.
Indeed, the vast majority of sexual abuse committed by American
soldiers, both during the Vietnam War and the War on Terror, has
never been accounted for in a court of law. While Lynndie England,
Charles Graner, and a few others have been convicted in military
courts for their treatment of detainees at Abu Ghraib, including vari-
ous forms of sexual violence,15 most of the violence has remained
unaddressed, at least in official fora.16 Unfortunately, this is not sur-
prising, since the historical, global norm has been immunity for sex-
ual violence committed during times of war and political unrest' 7-an
10. BROWNMILLER, supra note 9, at 107, 111; WEAVER, supra note 9, at 35, 51.
11. The Uniform Code of Military Justice prohibits rape, currently stating that "any
person . . . who commits an act of sexual intercourse, by force and without consent, is
guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial
may direct." 10 U.S.C. § 920 (2006).
12. See Solis, supra note 9, at 67.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 68 (citing W. Hays Parks, Crimes in Hostilities, Part I, MARINE CORPs GAZETrE,
Aug. 1976, at 18, available at http://archive.mca-marines.org/gazette/2006/
06haysparkslreprint.pdf).
15. See, e.g., Mark Follman & Tracy Clark-Flory, Prosecutions and Convictions: A Look at
Accountability to Date for Abuses at Abu Ghraib and in the Broader "War on Terror", SALON.COM
(Mar. 14, 2006, 3:03 ET), http://www.salon.com/news/abu-ghraib/2006/03/14/prosecu-
tions convictions/index.html; Rumann, supra note 2, at 273.
16. Unfortunately, not only foreign populations have suffered from rape and sexual
violence perpetrated by American soldiers; female American soldiers purportedly suffer
sexual assaults at twice the rate in the civilian population but often do not report such
assaults due to fear of retribution and a lack of confidentiality. Nancy Gibbs, Sexual Assaults
on Female Soldiers: Don't Ask, Don't Tell, TIME MAG. (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.time.com/
time/magazine/article/0,9171,19681 10,00.html#ixzzlKeaMqnKN.
17. See, e.g., Thom Shanker, Sexual Violence, in CIuMES OF WAR 323, 323 (Roy Gutman
et al. eds., 1999) (arguing that customary laws of war had "scant impact on public accept-
ance of rape as a natural, if unfortunate, by-product when men took up arms against
men").
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immunity that international and domestic courts have only recently
begun to challenge.18
In this Article, we review the evolution of the international juris-
prudence related to sexual violence to demonstrate structural and
normative advances designed to increase accountability for sexual vio-
lence during times of war and political unrest. The U.S. government
can and should consider such advances, including the shift toward
greater accountability, as it continues to develop its approach to com-
bating war-related sexual violence. We also discuss the tremendous
need for domestic mechanisms to address sexual abuses committed
during periods of political upheaval. Such mechanisms would circum-
vent the significant resource and jurisdictional constraints imposed on
international criminal tribunals, the primary drivers currently ensur-
ing accountability for wartime abuses. Specifically, this Article consid-
ers how recent international and domestic legislation suggest a
growing attention to sexual violence and related offenses, as well as an
emerging international consensus as to which sexualized practices
should be considered criminal.
In recent years, while jurisprudence at the international, re-
gional, and national levels has come to recognize an ever-expanding
array of sexually violent crimes-ranging from sexual harassment to
gang rape-and an ever-expanding array of victims-including men
and children-several obstacles to full accountability remain. For ex-
ample, in addition to an almost pandemic failure to prosecute crimes
of sexual violence, many courts continue to grapple with such tasks as
defining the crimes of sexual violence and sexual assault, as well as
clarifying where consent ends and force begins. Courts have also
struggled with the conditions under which high-level officials should
be held liable for sexual violence committed by their subordinates.
Despite these challenges, however, the jurisprudence of sexual vio-
lence continues to evolve to better acknowledge and redress the hor-
rific experiences of victims, including recognizing the all too common
use of sexual violence as a "weapon of war."19
18. See id. at 323-29.
19. See Rumann, supra note 2, at 274; Rape as a Weapon of War: Sexual Violence in
Armed Conflict, Testimony Submitted to the S. Judiciary Comm., Subcomm. on Hum. Rts.
and the Rule of Law, at 3 (2008) (statement of Alexandra Arriaga, Amnesty Int'l USA),
available at http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/svaw/pdf/IVAWA Apro8Senate-testi-
mony.pdf.
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I. The Development of International Legal Norms
Criminalizing Sexual Violence
Prohibitions against sexual violence have been codified as part of
international humanitarian law since at least the late 1800s, with some
warrior codes prohibiting sexual violence as far back as the first cen-
tury.20 In the intervening decades, the ways in which these norms have
been defined and adjudicated have evolved considerably.
In slightly more than a century, international prohibitions against
sexual violence have been transformed from vague protections af-
forded women by virtue of their status as the property of men, 21 to
well-defined, gender-neutral declarations that establish rape and
other forms of sexual violence as among the most egregious of crimes.
Customary international law prohibiting sexual violence during con-
flict was first codified in the United States during the Civil War.2 2 In
1863, Abraham Lincoln and the Union government released General
Order No. 100,23 now known as the Lieber Code. Guided by "the prin-
ciples of justice, honor, and humanity,"24 the Lieber Code sought to
regulate the conduct of the Union Army during the war. The Lieber
Code is widely recognized as an important precursor to international
humanitarian law, prescribing that only lawful aggression could be
used to attain military victory.25 Amongst the behavior prohibited by
the Lieber Code were acts of wanton and unnecessary violence, which
were illegal and prohibited at every rank in the Union Army. 26 Both
rape and sexual violence were understood to be "wanton violence"
and thus not permitted during times of war.2 7 More specifically, arti-
20. See PATRICIA VISEUR SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN CONFLICT:
THE IMPORTANCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AS MEANS OF INTERPRETATION 6-7 (2009) [hereinafter
SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/en-
glish/issues/women/docs/PaperProsecution ofSexualViolence.pdf.
21. See, e.g., JANE DOWDESWELL, WOMEN ON RAPE 43 (1986).
22. KELLY DAwN ASKIN, WAR CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN: PROSECUTION IN INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIBUNALS 35-36 (1997). As early as 1847, the United States military explicitly
banned rape. Id. at 34 (excerpting Order No. 20, a supplement to the U.S. Rules and
Articles of War).
23. General Orders No. 100: Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United
States in the Field (Apr. 24, 1863), reprinted in THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 3 (Dietrich
Schindler & Jiof Toman eds., 1988) [hereinafter Lieber Code].
24. Lieber Code, supra note 23, art. 4.
25. See Patricia Viseur Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence: Sexual Violence as Violations
of International Humanitarian Law, in 1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL LAw: COMMENTARY 263, 271-73 (Gabrielle Kirk McDonald & Olivia
Swaak-Goldman eds., 2000) [hereinafter Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence].
26. Lieber Code, supra note 23, art. 44.
27. See id. arts. 37, 44, 47.
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cle 37 of the Lieber Code, which governs the administration of occu-
pied territory, expressly protected against rape: "The United States
acknowledge and protect, in hostile countries occupied by them, relig-
ion and morality; strictly private property; the persons of the inhabi-
tants, especially those of women; and the sacredness of domestic relations."28
Under article 44 of the Code, the punishment for any perpetrator
caught in the act of rape who refused to cease such conduct, was im-
mediate execution.29
In 1907, the Lieber Code was adopted as international law at the
International Peace Conference in Copenhagen and became the basis
for Hague Convention IV for respecting the laws and customs of war
on land.30 In conjunction with the earlier Hague Convention of
1899,31 the Hague Convention IV of 190732 quickly became the lead-
ing authority underlying international humanitarian law. Both article
XLVI of the 1899 Convention and article 46 of the 1907 Convention
indirectly enjoined rape, speaking to the protection of "family hon-
our, "" which was widely understood to forbid sexual violence.34 Much
like in the Lieber Code, such violence was prohibited both during war
and during occupation.35
One of the first attempts to prosecute war crimes through an in-
ternational tribunal took place during the aftermath of World War I.
In an effort to hold German troops accountable for their crimes, the
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and the
Enforcement of Penalties endeavored to prosecute Kaiser Wilhelm
11.36 Amongst the variety of crimes indexed by the Commission were
28. Id. art. 37 (emphasis added).
29. Id. art. 44.
30. International Humanitarian Law--Treaties & Documents, Iwr'L COMMITrEE RED
CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/73cb71dl8dc4372741256739003e6372/a25aa5871a04
919bcl2563cd002d65c5?OpenDocument (last visited Feb 4, 2011).
31. Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899,
32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter First Hague II].
32. Annex to the Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, art. 4, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539 (Oct. 1907) [hereinafter Hague IV].
33. See First Hague II, supra note 31, at 1803, 1822; Hague IV, supra note 32, at 2277,
2306.
34. Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence, supra note 25, at 275 n.64.
35. Id. at 275.
36. JOHN HORNE ET AL., GERMAN ATROcrrIEs 1914: A HIsroRY OF DENIAL 331 (2001).
Some scholars, however, place the origins of accountability for rape in an international
military tribunal as much earlier, noting the 1474 conviction of Sir Peter van Hagenbach
for crimes committed during the military occupation of the town of Breisach in Austria. See
Shanker, supra note 17, at 323; AsKIN, supra note 22, at 5 n.11.
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rape and the abduction of women for prostitution.37 Unfortunately,
the international community fell short of prosecuting these crimes,
amongst others, as American authorities expressed significant con-
cern over the thought of prosecuting Kaiser Wilhelm in an interna-
tional tribunal, suggesting that national military courts were a
preferable alternative.38 Thus, no international tribunal was created.
Because of this, as well as a lack of political will for war-related trials
more generally, and the evidentiary and capacity issues that tend to
arise with widespread sex crimes, soldiers were largely excused from
accountability for the numerous incidents of rape and sexual assault
that had occurred.39
During the Second World War, rape and sexual violence were
more actively acknowledged and accounted for. Extensive documenta-
tion of incidents of rape and sexual violence committed by German
and Japanese military forces can be found, including revelations
about the infamous "comfort stations" implemented by the Japanese
government to provide sexual services for military personnel during
the war. 40 Although reporting on violations committed by American
troops is less pervasive, subsequent investigations have revealed Japa-
nese women's allegations of rape by American soldiers in Okinawa,41
as well as rapes of French women "sufficiently pervasive to cause Gen-
eral Eisenhower's headquarters to issue a directive . .. instructing that
speedy and appropriate punishments be administered."4 2
While the Lieber Code and Hague Conventions' prohibitions
against sexual violence had been based on the notion that women de-
37. Sellers, The Context of Sexual Violence, supra note 25, at 276.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., James R. McHenry III, The Prosecution of Rape Under International Law: jus-
tice that is Long Overdue, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1269, 1276-77 (2002) (noting the gen-
eral lack of accountability for war crimes committed during World War I); ASKIN, supra
note 22, at 48 ("Even after reports of thousands of rapes during World War I, there were
no post-war initiatives to prevent future abuses.").
40. SeeYOSHIMI YOSHIAKI, COMFORT WOMEN: SEXUAL SLAVERY IN THEJAPANESE MILITARY
DURING WORLD WAR II (Suzanne O'Brien trans., 2000) [hereinafter COMFORT WOMEN];
James Sterngold, Japan Admits Army Forced Women into War Brothels, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993,
at A2; Teresa Watanabe, Japan Admits That WWII Sex Slaves Were Coerced, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,
1993, at Al; Tamara L. Tompkins, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime: Speaking the Unspeakable,
70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 845, 864-65 (1995).
41. See PETER ScHRIjvERs, THE GI WAR AGAINST JAPAN (2002).
42. Madeline Morris, By Force of Arms: Rape, War and Military Culture, 45 DUKE L.J. 651,
655 n.5 (1996) (citation omitted). The author reports statistical data from World War II
suggesting that during certain World War II army advances, or "'breakouts,'" in France
and Germany, the rates of rape committed by military forces was almost three times that of
the normal civilian rate. Id. at 666, 666 n.46, 669 n.56, 669-70.
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served protection because they were the property of men, it was not
until the introduction of the Nuremberg Trials in 1949 that courts
were directed to seriously consider rape and sexual violence as crimes
against women themselves.43 Control Council Law No. 10, which was
adopted by the occupying powers in Germany and served as the basis
for later prosecutions of German military and civilian personnel that
were overseen by U.S. authorities, listed rape for the first time as a
crime against humanity in an attempt to provide a uniform basis for
prosecuting war criminals.4 4 One scholar notes three important prin-
ciples established by this law:
(1) that rape on a wide scale could be prosecuted as a war crime;
(2) that crimes of sexual violence committed during peacetime
could constitute crimes against humanity; and (3) that responsibil-
ity for such crimes could not be limited to military personnel and
consequently, liability could attach to persons occupying other key
positions. 45
Interestingly, though, the Nuremberg Charter-which estab-
lished the rules and procedures governing the International Military
Tribunal through which prominent members of the Nazi party were
tried following World War II-did not specifically mention rape
among its enumerated list of prohibited acts, 46 nor did any prosecu-
tions for rape per se take place during the Nuremberg Trials.47 In arti-
cle 6(c), the Nuremberg Charter did define Crimes Against
43. See David S. Mitchell, The Prohibition of Rape in International Humanitarian Law as a
Norm of Jus Cogens: Clanfying the Doctrine, 15 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 219, 238, 238 n.69
(2005); Mark Ellis, Breaking the Silence: Rape as an International Crime, 38 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 225, 227-29 (2007); see generally Dustin A. Lewis, Unrecognized Victims: Sexual Violence
Against Men in Conflict Settings Under International Law, 27 Wis. INT'L.J. 22 (2009).
44. 1 TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE
NURENBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAw No. 10, at 250 app. D
(1949).
45. Lewis, supra note 43, at 22-23 (citing Catherine N. Niarchos, Women, War and
Rape: Challenges Facing the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 Hum. RTs. Q.
649, 677-78, 678 n.175 (1995)).
46. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of
the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg
Charter], available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp.
47. ASKIN, supra note 22, at 163. However, as Askin explains, the Nuremberg Tribunal
did permit evidence of sexual violence in prosecuting crimes against humanity, and in that
sense, it allowed prosecution of sexual violence. Id. at 142, 163.
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Humanity,48 however, which became an important precursor to later
laws prohibiting rape and sexual violence.49
The Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far
East ("IMTFE")-created through special proclamation by Gen.
Douglas MacArthur to try leaders of the Empire of Japan following
World War II-similarly contained no direct reference to rape or sex-
ual violence.5 0 However, IMTFE defendants were charged with rape
and sexual violence.5' The IMTFE charter contained three categories
of crimes: conspiracy to wage war, commission of crimes against hu-
manity, and failure to prevent atrocities at the command level.5 2
Under this last category, General Iwane Matsui, Commander
Shunroku Hata, and Foreign Minister Hirota were all found guilty of
crimes-including rape-through a theory of vertical liability by
which a commander may be held liable for war crimes perpetrated by
his troops if he knew the crimes were occurring and had the power to
stop them but failed to prevent them or to punish offenders.53 These
convictions should be contrasted, however, with the failure to pursue
accountability on behalf of the more than two hundred thousand Jap-
anese women who were forcibly placed in rape camps (the "comfort
stations" referenced above) by the Japanese government. 54 Japanese
military rulers used these camps as a means of "institutionalized sexual
violence" intended to check unauthorized sexual violence in Japanese
occupied territories and prevent the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases beyond the camps.5 5 Such rape camps were based on certain
48. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 46, art. 6(c) ("Crimes against humanity: namely,
murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, ra-
cial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the juris-
diction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country
where perpetrated.").
49. See ASKIN, supra note 22, at 345-47.
50. See generally Charter of the International Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946,
T.I.A.S. No. 1589, 4 Bevans 20 [hereinafter IMFTE].
51. AsiaN, supra note 22, at 180, 202-03; Ellis, supra note 43, at 228; Richard J. Gold-
stone & Estelle A. Dehon, Engendering Accountability: Gender Crimes Under International Crimi-
nal Law, 19 NEw ENG. J. PUB. PoL'Y 121 (2003); SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL
VIOLENCE, supra note 20.
52. IMFTE, supra note 50, arts. 5(a)-(c).
53. Ellis, supra note 43, at 228.
54. Ellis has noted the continual plight of these women who have yet to receive any
measure of recognition or compensation. Id. See also COMFORT W'OMEN, supra note 40; YUMA
TOTANI, THE TOKYO WAR CRIMES TRIAL: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN THE WAKE OF WORLD
WAR 11 (2008).
55. Suzanne O'Brien, Translator's Introduction, in COMFORT WOMEN, supra note 40, at
1, 9 (noting that the Japanese military strategy "failed miserably"). In 2000, a mock trial was
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presumptions about male sexuality, particularly during times of war,
and failed to recognize the criminal nature of rape and sexual vio-
lence. Similarly invisible were the up to two million German women
estimated to have been raped by Soviet soldiers toward the end of
World War II, an event that has been called "the greatest phenome-
non of mass rape in history."56
Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 was the first
multilateral international agreement to both explicitly mention and
prohibit rape.57 The Geneva Conventions expanded the protections
previously available to individuals during wartime by granting new
protections to those hors de combat ("out of action") during conflict, as
well as civilians (those not taking part in hostilities). According to the
International Committee for the Red Cross, article 27 "occupies a key
position among the Articles of the [Fourth Geneva] Convention" by
proclaiming the foundational principles on which the conventions are
based.58 At a minimum, the convention entitles all protected persons
"to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their
religious convictions and practices, and their manners and customs.
They shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected
especially against all acts of violence or threats thereof and against
insults and public curiosity."59
The Convention then goes a step further by granting special pro-
tection to women, prohibiting "any attack on their honour, in particu-
lar against rape, enforced prostitution, or any form of indecent
assault."60 The International Council of Women and the International
Federation of Abolitionists provided the language for these additional
protections; Claude Pilloud of the International Committee of the
Red Cross urged their adoption during the drafting phase of the
Fourth Geneva Convention. 61 The article made rape, enforced prosti-
held in Japan during which the late Emperor Hirohito was found guilty of crimes against
humanity, and the government ofJapan liable, for this practice. See, e.g., 'Comfort Women'
Case, HAGUE JUSTICE PORTAL, http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/eCache/DEF/11/085
(last visited May 10, 2011) (summarizing the case and the court judgment).
56. Paul Sheehan, An Orgy of Denial in Hitler's Bunker, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD, May
17, 2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/05/16/1052885399546.html.
57. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 27, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
58. Commentaries on Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Geneva, 12 August 1949, at para. 1, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSs (ICRC), http://
www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/COM/380-600032?OpenDocument.
59. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 57, art. 27.
60. Id.
61. II-A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 643 (1949).
The travaux preparatoires of the convention show no resistance to his proposal. Id.
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tution, and other forms of indecent assault illegal, but the convention
stopped short of including rape as among the grave breaches 62 listed
in article 147. Although not mandated, rape could, of course, still be
prosecuted domestically.
In combination, articles 146 and 147 create a regime of enumer-
ated acts that bind contracting parties to pursue and prosecute those
persons within the territory of a contracting state who violate those
specific prohibitions.63 While the convention does not include specific
reference to rape or other forms of sexual violence as "grave
breaches," some scholars have argued that rape could be included
among the grave breaches by implication. 64 The travaux prdparatoires
(the official record of the negotiations underlying the development of
the Convention) do not indicate whether rape and sexual violence
were considered for inclusion among the grave breaches, nor do they
clarify whether any of the enumerated grave breaches were intended
to encompass rape and sexual violence.65
Several decades later, on June 8, 1977, the Geneva Conventions'
Additional Protocols I and II entered into force to address changes in
methods of warfare that had developed in the intervening decades
since World War II, including during the Vietnam War. 6 6 Susan
Brownmiller's seminal work Against Our Will contained the first widely
available treatment of rape during the Vietnam War. 6 7 She relied on
testimony from journalists who spent time in the field, court-martial
62. Those crimes that are termed "grave breaches" carry with them an obligation on
the part of nations to enact and enforce laws that penalize those who engage in such
activities.
63. Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 57, arts. 146, 147.
64. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 9 ("[T] he grave
breaches enumerated in [art.] 147 . . . 'obviously cover[ ] not only rape, but also any other
attack on a woman's dignity.'") (citation omitted); see also Patricia Viseur Sellers, Sexual
Violence and Peremptory Norms: The Legal Value of Rape, 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287, 298
(2002) [hereinafter Sellers, Sexual Violence]; Practice Relating to Rule 93. Rape and Other Forms
ofSexual Violence, INT'L COMMITTEE RED CROSS (ICRC), http://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/
eng/docs/v2_rul-rule93 (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
65. See I Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 216, 235,
274, 328 (1949); II-A Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949, at 217,
230, 603, 873 (1949); I-B Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference of Geneva of 1949,
passim (1949).
66. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1), adoptedJune
8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Con-
ventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adoptedJune 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 (1979) [hereinafter
Protocol II].
67. BROWNMILLER, supra note 9.
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records, and eyewitness testimony offered during the 1971 Winter Sol-
dier Investigation. 68 In short, she found that rape and other forms of
sexual violence were widely perpetrated by the American military,
ranging from military-run brothels located in some Army camps, to
rape, gang rape, and sexual torture committed by soldiers while on
patrol.69
More recently Gina Marie Weaver has reviewed oral histories of
South Vietnamese peasants70 to corroborate accounts of sexual vio-
lence uncovered by the Winter Soldier Investigation7 1 and reports
that three forms of sexual violence were common: sexual torture of
prisoners, rape, and "murder rape (often associated with mass kill-
ings) ."72 Sexual torture of male prisoners occurred, while rape and
sexual mutilation, or threat of such treatment, was often used as a
technique to extract information from female prisoners.7 3 Weaver re-
ports one eyewitness account from an American soldier who testified
to the prevalence of rape: "In other words, if I saw a woman, I'd say,
'Well, it won't be too long.' That's how widespread it was." 7 4
Additional Protocol I-which applies to situations of interna-
tional armed conflict-explicitly prohibits "outrages upon personal
dignity," including enforced prostitution and indecent assault.75 It
also explicitly prohibits the rape of women but still does not include
rape or sexual violence among the grave breaches, leaving state actors
without the pursue-and-prosecute obligation.7 6 Additional Protocol
II-relating to non-international armed conflict-prohibits rape with-
out regard to biological sex7 7 but is restricted in force due to the lim-
ited number of states that have ratified the treaty.78 Nevertheless, by
the early 1990s, International Humanitarian Law at least prohibited
sexual violence perpetrated against civilians, combatants, and prison-
68. See id. at 86-113.
69. Id.
70. WEAVER, supra note 9, at 32 (citing MARTHA HEss, THEN THE AMERICANS CAME:
VOICES FROM VIETNAM (1994)).
71. Weaver reports that the full transcript of the investigation includes twenty-one
separate eyewitness accounts of rape or sexual violence. WEAVER, supra note 9, at 54.
72. Id. at 33.
73. Id. at 33-34.
74. Id. at 75.
75. Protocol I, supra note 66, art. 75(2)(b).
76. Id. art. 76.
77. Protocol II, supra note 66, art. 4(2) (e).
78. Sellers, Sexual Violence, supra note 64, at 299.
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ers of war during periods of armed conflict,79 although prosecution
for such crimes remained anything but certain.
These efforts to recognize sexual violence as criminal, most nota-
bly undertaken through Allied Control Council Law No. 10 and the
1949 Geneva Conventions, laid the basic foundations for the develop-
ment of the international crime of rape, although the laws and norms
that emerged from these endeavors had little practical impact on the
prosecution of sexual violence. It was not until the 1990s that the In-
ternational Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("Rwanda Tribunal") and
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia ("Yugo-
slavia Tribunal") would become the primary engines driving the devel-
opment of an international jurisprudence prohibiting rape and sexual
violence during war; with no binding international definitions for
these crimes, the tribunals struggled to create workable definitions for
use by their courts. The legal doctrines that emerged from these tribu-
nals ultimately laid the foundation for relatively broad definitions of
rape and sexual violence and established a key list of elements that
must be satisfied to ensure accountability.
H. The Refinement of International Criminal Accountability
for Sexual Violence Through the Ad Hoc Tribunals
The Rwanda Tribunal and the Yugoslavia Tribunal have been two
of the primary engines driving the contemporary evolution of rape
and sexual violence jurisprudence.8 0 Prior to the creation of these
tribunals in the 1990s, international law had failed to clearly articulate
the elements necessary for the effective prosecution of rape and sex-
ual violence.81 Thus, the tribunals had to establish their own defini-
tions, which they did during a series of key cases. Through these cases,
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals have helped clarify interna-
tional norms prohibiting rape and other forms of sexual violence dur-
79. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 10 n.33 ("In
summary, this represents the combined protection of the four Geneva Conventions of
1949, inclusive of Common Article 3 and the two Additional Protocols of 1977 to the four
Geneva Conventions.").
80. Mitchell, supra note 43, at 240 (listing the following successes of the Rwanda Tri-
bunal and Yugoslavia Tribunal: "expanding the definitions of crimes against humanity and
genocide to include rape; the participation of women in high-level positions and the inclu-
sion of staff sensitive to gender issues; effectively prosecuting various forms of sexual vio-
lence as instruments of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, means of torture,
forms of persecution and enslavement; and generally defining, clarifying and redressing
gender-related crimes.").
81. Ellis, supra note 43, at 229.
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ing times of war and political unrest.82 In particular, the tribunals
have included rape/sexual violence as a constituent violation under
the crimes of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, in the Rwanda Tribunal, was the first case
from the tribunals to render a decision that directly implicated rape
and sexual violence.83 Akayesu was a bourgmestre-the top-ranking pub-
lic official in his particular commune-who was found to have known
about and been present for several instances of sexual violence and
sexual abuse that occurred under his authority, including rape and
forced nudity.8 4 He was charged with rape as a constituent act of
crimes against humanity, outrages upon personal dignity as a war
crime, and sexual violence as a constituent act of genocide.85
Two aspects of the Ahayesu decision are particularly important.
First, the Trial Chamber in Akayesu discussed the relationship between
sexual violence and genocide. Namely, sexual violence could be com-
mitted with the intent of killing members of a group, 6 could consti-
tute serious bodily or mental harm,87 could be composed of measures
intended to prevent births within the group,88 and could amount to
forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 9 This
was an unprecedented development in international law.
Second, the trial chamber identified the specific elements of the
crime of rape, for the first time in international law, and distinguished
sexual violence from rape. Although the Rwanda Tribunal had previ-
ously included rape among the enumerated acts that could constitute
crimes against humanity,90 it was in Akayesu that a Trial Chamber first
defined rape as "a physical invasion of a sexual nature committed on a
person under circumstances which are coercive."91 Sexual violence
82. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 12-13. It should
be noted that in early cases the specific elements of sexual-violence crimes were only eluci-
dated upon a conviction or acquittal. Id. at 13.
83. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement (Sept. 2, 1998).
84. Id. 11 704-07.
85. Id. 6 ("The Indictment").
86. Akayesu, ICTR 96-4-T, 733.
87. Id. 731.
88. Id. 507 (including acts such as sexual mutilation, sterilization, forced birth con-
trol, separation of the sexes, and prohibition of marriages).
89. Id. 509.
90. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda art. 3(g), Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1602. Also, the Trial Chamber concluded that sexual violence could be included
under the Statute's prohibitions against "inhumane acts" in art. 3(i), "outrages upon per-
sonal dignity" in art. 4(e), and "serious bodily or mental harm" in art. 2(2)(b). Akayesu,
ICTR 96-4-T, 688.
91. Akayesu, ICTR 964-T, 1 598.
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was broadly defined as "any act of a sexual nature which is committed
on a person under circumstances which are coercive."92 Such an act,
the Trial Chamber declared, could involve dignitary harms that did
not involve penetration or even physical contact.93 For example, the
instance of a student being forced to publicly undress and do gymnas-
tics in the nude was found to constitute sexual violence. 9 4 Two other
issues the Tribunal addressed were whether a victim needed to estab-
lish that he or she had been coerced into sexual behavior-something
that could be difficult to prove and thus a major barrier to prosecu-
tion-or whether the accused could raise a defense that the victim
had consented to the sexually-violent conduct. In addressing coer-
cion, the Trial Chamber determined that "coercive circumstances
need not be evidenced by a show of physical force. Threats, intimida-
tion, extortion and other forms of duress that prey on fear or despera-
tion may constitute coercion, and coercion may be inherent in certain
circumstances, such as armed conflict."9 5 They further clarified that in
the presence of coercion, the need to prove a lack of consent was
obviated. Thus, as the violence under Akayesu's control was deemed
coercive, the Trial Chamber did not have to analyze the issue of con-
sent.9 6 Prosecutor v. Musema, decided approximately two years later, af-
firmed much of the jurisprudence established in Akayesu.9 7
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, quickly fol-
lowed the Akayesu judgment.98 Anto Furundzija was a commander of
"The Jokers," a special unit of the military police of the Croatian De-
fense Council.99 Furundzija, along with another soldier, interrogated
"Witness A," who was in their custody; as Furundzija questioned Wit-
ness A, the other soldier rubbed a knife along her inner thigh and
threatened to insert it into her vagina if she did not truthfully answer
their questions.100 In addition to charges related to this circumstance,
Furundzija was accused of failing to intervene while Witness A was
92. Id.
93. Id. 1 688.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. See SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 20.
97. Prosecutor v. Alfred Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-1.3-T, Judgement and Sentence
(Jan. 27, 2000).
98. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T,Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 10, 1998).
99. Id. 1 38 ("The Amended Indictment").
100. Id.
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forced to have oral and vaginal sexual intercourse with the knife-
wielding soldier.101
Because the decision of one tribunal is not necessarily binding
upon another, the Trial Chamber for the Yugoslavia Tribunal also de-
cided to establish the elements of rape and did so in part to deter-
mine whether rape could constitute torture. The Tribunal ultimately
defined the violation as:
(i) the sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the
penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of force
against a victim or third person.102
Using this definition, the Tribunal convicted Furundzija of torture, as
well as outrages of personal dignity-both war crimes under Common
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and incorporated under article 3
of the statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.1 0 3
The Trial Chamber's holding that rape could constitute torture
was a significant development in international law. 04 Although on ap-
peal, Furundzija challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against
him,105 the Appeals Chamber affirmed the judgment in its entirety.106
Prosecutor v. Kunarac was the first Yugoslavia Tribunal case to find
individuals guilty of rape as a constituent offense of crimes against
humanity.107 Crimes against humanity differ from war crimes by,
among other things, not requiring a nexus to armed conflict, but re-
quiring that any crimes have been committed as part of a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population.108 Dragoljub
Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic were ethnic Serbs who
took part in a Serb military campaign in the municipality of Foca in
the Republika Srpska. One of the purposes of the military campaign
was to cleanse the municipality of Muslims, especially through a cam-
paign of terror targeting Muslim women.109 The Yugoslavia Tribunal
101. Id.
102. Id. 1 185.
103. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 20.
104. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, 163 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000).
105. Id. 11 80-127.
106. Id.
107. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, Judgement (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001).
108. Id.
109. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Judgement of
Trial Chamber II in the Kunarac, Kovac and Vukovic Case (Feb. 22, 2001).
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referred to this case as the "rape camp" case, as the three defendants
had taken part in systematic sexual violence against Muslim women
that had included maintaining a detention center and other facilities
in which women and girls were routinely raped.110 The three men
were charged and convicted of rape as a war crime and as a crime
against humanity under articles 5(g) and 3 of the Yugoslavia Tribunal
statute for personally raping, or being present while other soldiers
raped, Muslim women.111
However, in Kunarac, the Trial Chamber departed from the defi-
nitions of rape established in Furundzifa by including a two-pronged
lack-of-consent element that required assessing the lack of consent of
the victim and the knowledge of the perpetrator that the victim did
not consent.112 The Trial Chamber reasoned that this change was nec-
essary because the facts of Furundzija were narrower than in Kunarac,
and the "non-consensual or non-voluntary" element of the crime
needed to be calibrated to reflect the appropriate scope of the norm
against rape under international law.' 13 This was a significant change
in international legal jurisprudence, as the court included an explicit
inquiry into the consent of the victim rather than an inquiry into the
presence of force or coercion, which would imply nonconsent.
The Trial Chamber offered this definition of rape:
[T]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or anus
of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other object
used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by the
penis of the perpetrator; where such sexual penetration occurs
without the consent of the victim. Consent for this purpose must
be consent given voluntarily, as a result of the victim's free will,
assessed in the context of the surrounding circumstances. The mens
rea is the intention to effect this sexual penetration, and the knowl-
edge that it occurs without the consent of the victim. 114
The Trial Chamber found that the "basic principle" underlying
the crime of rape was a violation of sexual autonomy, which is cap-
tured by the consent prong of the definition. 115 Nevertheless, the
Trial Chamber softened the requirement somewhat by also stating
that consent could not be offered as a defense if the "victim has been
subjected to or threatened with or has reason to fear violence, duress,
110. Id.
111. Kunarac, IT-96-23/1-T, 1f 4-8, 685-727, 782, 822.
112. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 20-21.
113. See Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/1-T, 1 459.
114. Id. 1 460.
115. Id. 1 457.
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detention or psychological oppression.""16 On appeal, the defendants
challenged the Trial Chamber's definition of rape, arguing that the
standard should be that victims must show "continuous" or "genuine"
resistance to demonstrate nonconsent." 7 The Appeals Chamber, how-
ever, rejected the defendants' argument and affirmed the Trial Cham-
ber's approach." 8
The next significant attempt to grapple with the standard in an
international tribunal appeared in Prosecutor v. Gacumbistsi.19 As
noted above, Kunarac had required physical elements of penetration
coupled with the lack of a victim's consent and the perpetrator's
knowledge of the victim's lack of consent. The second prong of the
Kunarac consent test-that the alleged perpetrator committed the act
with knowledge of the victim's lack of consent-can be an especially
difficult element to satisfy in the context of armed conflict. In Gacum-
bitsi, the Appeals Chamber reexamined the lack-of-consent element,
purportedly to clarify any ambiguity in the relevant jurisprudence.12 0
On appeal, the prosecution argued that lack of consent should not be
considered an element of the offense that the prosecution has to
prove but rather that the defendant could attempt to show consent by
the victim as a defense against the charges, effectively shifting the bur-
den of proof'21 from the prosecution to the defense, thereby facilitat-
ing a conviction.122 The Appeals Chamber affirmed that both the
victim's nonconsent and the accused's knowledge of lack-of-consent
are elements that must be established by the prosecution.123 The Ap-
peals Chamber did, however, elaborate that nonconsent may be
116. Id. 1 462.
117. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23-A, IT-96-23/1-A,Judgement, 1 125 (Jun.
12, 2002).
118. Id. 128.
119. SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 21-22 (refer-
encing Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, 755 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003); Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2, Judgement
and Sentence, 113 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 18, 2003)). The
Kunurac definition was also employed by the Rwandan Tribunal in Prosecutor v. Semanza,
Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement and Sentence, 1 345 (May 15, 2003).
120. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-T, Judgement (June 17, 2004);
see also SELLERS, THE PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 20, at 22-23.
121. "Burden of proof" is a legal term of art that signifies which party has the burden of
affirmatively proving his case. For example, must the prosecution affirmatively establish
that a particular act occurred (as occurs when the prosecution has the burden of proof), or
is it the defense's burden to establish that a particular act did not occur? In cases of a "tie,"
where it is difficult to tell whether the act did or did not occur, the party with the burden
of proof will be the one to "lose."
122. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A, 147.
123. Id. 1 153.
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proven if circumstances can be demonstrated "under which meaning-
ful consent is not possible."1 2 4 Per this standard, the prosecution does
not need to produce evidence of the victim's conduct or evidence in-
dicating the use or threat of force, but rather nonconsent may be in-
ferred from examining relevant and admissible evidence of the
background circumstances, such as an "ongoing genocide campaign"
or detention of the victim. 1 25 The Gacumbitsi decision, however, seems
to stop short of creating a presumption that such situations are inher-
ently coercive. 126
Importantly, for purposes of comparison with abuses perpetrated
at Abu Ghraib, Guant~inamo and other military detention sites, the
use of sexual violence against men also gained some precedent during
this period, helping to underscore the possibility that men could be
the victims of sexual violence. For example, in the Tadic case prose-
cuted in the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Dusko Tadic was convicted under
Common Article 3 for a violation of the laws or customs of war, for the
role that he played in the forcing of a detainee to bite off the testicle
of another.127 The Celebici Prison-Camp case continued this trend;
there, defendant Zejnil Delalic was convicted of inhumane acts in part
for forcing two men (brothers) to commit fellatio on each other.128 In
that case, the court noted that this could have constituted rape instead
of cruel treatment, "if pleaded in the appropriate manner."1 29
In summary, due to the work of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia
Tribunals, as well as other courts, the issue of sexual violence has
gained critical prominence in international law, as has an understand-
ing of its potential breadth-both in terms of what acts are sexual
violence and who might be considered victims. 13 0 The international
124. Id. 1 155.
125. Id.
126. The Appeals Chamber affirmed this definition in Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case
No. ICTR-99-52-A, Judgement, (Nov. 28, 2007). For more information on the debate sur-
rounding the "lack of consent" element, see A.L.M. de Brouwer, Gacumbitsi judgement, in
ANNOTATED LEADING CASES OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS, VOLUME 24: THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA 2005-2006, at 583, 583-94 (Andre Klip & Goran
Sluiter eds., 2009).
127. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, 1 198 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997).
128. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, 1062 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
129. Id. 1 1066. See also Shanker, supra note 17, at 326.
130. Additional cases from the Rwandan Tribunal that we do not have room to cover
that are particularly notable for the detail they contribute to the international jurispru-
dence of sexual violence include Prosecutor v. Renzaho, Case No. ICTR-97-31-T, Trial
Judgment (July 14, 2009); Prosecutor v. Muvunyi, Case No. ICTR-2000-55A-T, Judgment
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approach to sexual violence during armed conflict has moved dramat-
ically away from norms that conceived of sexual violence as a violation
of a man's property rights over a woman,'13 to norms that come closer
to respecting the human dignity and bodily integrity of the victims
themselves.132 Equally important has been the development of inter-
national jurisprudence that has established sexual violence as a con-
stituent element of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes, including rape and torture. Ultimately, the gains realized in
the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals have paved the way for the pros-
ecution of rape and other forms of sexual violence in the Interna-
tional Criminal Court.
M. Accountability for Sexual Violence Through the
International Criminal Court
In July of 1998, a diplomatic conference gathered in Rome to
finalize the framework for a permanent institution with the authority
to investigate and prosecute "the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community,"133 including genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity.134 The resulting Rome Statute of the Inter-
national Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") was overwhelmingly
adopted on July 17, 1998.135 By July 1, 2002, sixty-six countries had
and Sentence (Sept. 12, 2006); Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgement
and Sentence (May 15, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rukundo, Case No. ICTR-2001-70-T, Trial
Judgment (Feb. 27, 2009); Prosecutor v. Kamuhanda, Case No. ICTR-99-54A-T, Judgement
and Sentence (Jan. 22, 2004); Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement
(Dec. 18, 2008); and Prosecutor v. Kajelijeli, Case No. ICTR-98-44A-T, Judgment and Sen-
tence (Dec. 1, 2003). Similarly important advances have been realized through other inter-
national and hybrid courts, such as the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Ad-Hoc
Tribunal for East Timor, as well as through the state court of Bosnia and Herzogovina.
131. See DOWDESWELL, supra note 21, at 43.
132. See, e.g., AsKiN, supra note 22, at 372-75.
133. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5(1), July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
134. See, e.g., United Nations, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Estab-
lishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, June 15-17, 1998, Official Records,
Vol. II, at 65 para. 12 (2002) [hereinafter United Nations, Diplomatic Conference of Pleni-
potentiaries] (summary records of the plenary meetings) ("Clearly, the Statute of the Court
must encompass genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes . . . ."), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/rome/proceedings/E/Rome%20Proceedings-v
2 _e.pdf.
See Christopher Keith Hall, The First Proposal for a Permanent International Criminal Court, 80
INT'L REv. RED CROSs 59 (1998).
135. THE RECKONING: THE BATTLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Skylight
Pictures 2009).
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ratified the statute, and the Court officially came into being.136 While
the Court's mandate to address only the highest level perpetrators
and most serious international crimes will limit it to a relatively small
number of cases, the Court has the potential to have a significant im-
pact, normatively and symbolically, on the development of interna-
tional criminal law, due to its enhanced visibility as a permanent
international court. Accordingly, we devote an entire section of our
Article to the structure, laws, and jurisprudence of this single
institution.
One of the ICC's most notable features has been its commitment
to expanding the scope of sexual violence-based crimes in interna-
tional law. Building upon the prior work of the Rwanda and Yugosla-
via Tribunals, the Rome Statute added sexual slavery, enforced
prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization, and other
forms of sexual violence to the list of war crimes and crimes against
humanity.'37 The Rome Statute further acknowledged that sexual vio-
lence could be committed against both men and women and con-
firmed that defendants could and should be held liable for their own
actions as well as those committed by their inferiors and/or partners,
through the theory of command responsibility and another form of
liability ("co-perpetration") that somewhat resembles the domestic
theory of conspiracy.'38
Another notable feature has been the ICC's unprecedented com-
mitment to ensuring victims a participatory role in the Court's pro-
ceedings.' 39 When the Rome Statute was being negotiated, civil law
countries were especially adamant that victims be accorded extensive
participatory rights.140 As French Justice Minister Elisabeth Guigou ar-
136. Ratification ofthe Rome Statute, COALITION INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/
?mod=romeratification (last visited Apr. 3, 2011). As of April 2011, the agreement had
been ratified by 114 countries and signed by 139.. Id.
137. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 7(1) (g); see ANNE-MARIE DE BROUWER, SUPRANA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE: THE ICC AND THE PRACTICE OF THE
ICTY AND THE ICTR 85-86 (2005); THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES AND RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE (Roy. S. Lee ed., 2001) [hereinafter ICC
ELEMENTS & RULES].
138. DE BROUWER, supra note 137, at 338.
139. See United Nations, Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries, supra note 134.
For example, Ms. Nagel Berger, Minister ofJustice for Costa Rica, emphasized the need for
the ICC to have "full powers" to deal with crimes infringing upon the dignity of women,
such as rape, sexual slaves, prostitution, and forced sterilization. Id. at 77. Ms. Obando, an
observer for the Women's Caucus for Gender Justice in the ICC, stressed the need for
gender compliance in the investigation of crimes. Id. at 96.
140. Mugambi Jouet, Reconciling the Conflicting Rights of Victims and Defendants at the Inter-
national Criminal Court, 26 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 249, 253-54 (2007); see also Who We Are,
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gued, "Victims are not simply witnesses whose participation ... should
be limited to gathering the information which they are able to pro-
vide. They have a separate role to play, and this must be recognized by
the [ICC]."141 This perspective contrasted with that of many common-
law countries, for whom the concept of victim participation was, quite
literally, a foreign one.142 The ICC ultimately adopted the broadest
victim-participation scheme of any previous tribunal. 143 This was in-
tended to enhance the capacity of the Court to empower victims, in-
cluding victims of sexual violence, to speak out about the atrocities
they experienced.
While the precise purpose behind such expansive participation is
somewhat ambiguous, 144 some commentators have suggested that it is
instrumentally designed "to reliev[e] the suffering and afford[ ] jus-
tice to victims not only through the conviction of the perpetrator by
[the] Court, but also by attempting to redress the consequences of
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes," 45 for example,
by granting reparations. Others have suggested the goal is expositive,
to help clarify the facts surrounding an alleged crime,'1 4 6 since victims
have experienced the atrocities firsthand and thus have valuable infor-
mation to share. Most agree, however, that the overall objective is to
VIcrIMs' RTs. WORKING GROUP http://www.vrwg.org/smartweb/about-vrwg/who-we-are
(last visited Apr. 27, 2011).
141. Claude Jorda & Jdr6me de Hemptinne, The Status and Role of the Victim, in 2 THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY, at 1397 (Antonio
Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (quoting tlisabeth Guigou, French Justice Minister, Address of
the Ministry of Justice at the International Colloquium on "L'Accas des victims A la Cour
Pdnale Internationale" (Apr. 27 1999)).
142. Jouet, supra note 140, at 253, 255-58.
143. The victim participation scheme adopted by the later-established Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia ("ECCC") would become even broader by empower-
ing some victims to become not only participants but parties to cases. SeeJames P. Bair,
From the Numbers Who Died to Those Who Survived: Victim Participation in the Extraordinary
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 31 U. HAw. L. REV. 507, 508 (2009).
144. Jouet, supra note 140, at 268 (explaining that, "Most importantly, the Statute and
Rules do not concretely specify the purpose of victim participation.").
145. Int'l Criminal Court, The Role of the Trust Fund for Victims and its Relation with the
Registry of the International Criminal Court, in PRESS-IuT: FIRST MEETING OF THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS OF THE TRUST FUND FOR ViCrIMs OF ICC (2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.
int/NR/rdonlyres/044E7728-77AB65-AC57-38485082E631/144059/PIDS0082004EN.
pdf; see also Linda M. Keller, SeekingJustice at the International Criminal Court: Victims' Repara-
tions, 29 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 189 (2007) (explaining the purpose of providing victim
reparations).
146. Miriam Cohen, Victims'Participation Rights Within the International Crimtnal Court: A
Critical Overview, 37 DENV. J. INT'L L. & Pot'Y 351, 353 (2009).
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give victims a voice in the proceedings and "to shed light on the suf-
fering and harm that occurred." 147
A. Prosecuting Sexual Violence Though the International Criminal
Court
1. Jurisdiction and Complementarity
Before crimes can be prosecuted through the ICC, including
crimes of sexual violence, a number of obstacles must be surmounted.
The first is ensuring that the Court has jurisdiction and the case is
admissible. The ICC can only prosecute individuals accused of com-
mitting or assisting in the commission of genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, and/or war crimes.14 8 The accused must be a national of a
country that has accepted the Court's jurisdiction, the crime must
have taken place within the borders of a country that accepts the
Court's jurisdiction, or the U.N. Security Council must have referred
the situation to the Court Prosecutor. In addition, the purported
crime must have taken place after the date that the Rome Statute en-
tered into force for the nation under consideration. 149
The second hurdle is satisfying the principle of complementarity:
the ICC is designed to complement-not replace-national court sys-
tems. Specifically, there must be an absence of national proceedings
designed to prosecute the alleged crime.150 A case is deemed inadmis-
sible if "the case is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which
has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable to carry
out the investigation or prosecution."1 5 1 The Court's Appeals Cham-
ber has elucidated this requirement, explaining that there is a twofold
test that must be passed to establish the requisite complementarity:
"[T]he initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing in-
147. Id. at 373.
148. About the Court, COALITION INT'L CRIM.CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=court
(last visited Apr. 27, 2011). The Court will also be able to exercise jurisdiction over crimes
of aggression, at the earliest, after January 1, 2017. See The Crime of Aggression, COALITION
INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=aggression (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
149. Jurisdiction and Admissibility, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm (last visited Oct.
29, 2010).
150. Indeed, per the principle of complementarity, it is the state and not the Court
that has primary responsibility for investigating and prosecuting serious international
crimes within its borders; the ICC is considered a "court of last resort" that acts only when
states cannot or will not. HUMAN RiGHTs WATCH, MAKING KAMPALA COUNT: ADVANCING THE
GLOBAL FIGHT AGAINST IMPUNITY AT THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE 35-53 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter MAKING KAMPALA COUNT], available at http://www.hrw.org/en/node/90282.
151. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 17(1) (a).
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vestigations or prosecutions, or (2) whether there have been investiga-
tions in the past and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to
prosecute the person concerned." 15 2 If those two questions are an-
swered affirmatively, then the Court must consider whether the nation
under consideration is unwilling or unable to prosecute. If so, then
the ICC can assume jurisdiction.
A third criterion is whether the case is of "sufficient gravity" to
justify the Court's involvement.15 3 In one decision, the Pre-Trial
Chamber explained that "all crimes that fall within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Court are serious, and thus, the reference to the
insufficiency of gravity is actually an additional safeguard, which pre-
vents the Court from investigating, prosecuting and trying peripheral
cases."154 Gravity can be established both quantitatively and qualita-
tively. For example, while the existence of a large number of victims
may help quantify a crime's gravity, "it is not Uust] the number of
victims that matter but rather the existence of some aggravating or
qualitative factors attached to the commission of crimes, which makes
it grave."' 55 Factors determining whether a crime is sufficiently grave
from a qualitative perspective include the geographical and temporal
intensity of the alleged crimes, the nature of the alleged crimes, how
the crimes were committed, and the impact on victims and their
families.' 56
Finally, as an overall principle, the ICC must deny jurisdiction if it
has "substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not
serve the interests of justice."1 5 7
Importantly, these requirements ensure that only a few individu-
als, relatively speaking, will ever be held accountable for their crimes
through the ICC. Thus, criminal prosecutions in national courts con-
tinue to be crucial mechanisms for addressing major crimes and les-
sening the threat of impunity, ' 58 even in countries where the ICC has
elected to act.
152. Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
178 (Sept. 25, 2009).
153. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 17(1) (d). See also jurisdiction and Admissibility,
INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/About+the+Court/ICC+at+a+glance/
Jurisdiction+and+Admissibility.htm (last visited Oct. 29, 2010).
154. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber II,
56 (Mar. 31, 2010) [hereinafter Kenya Decision].
155. Id. 62.
156. Id.
157. Id.; Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 53(1) (c).
158. For an excellent overview of some of the challenges to providing domestic trials to
complement international prosecutions that have arisen at the ICIY, see Anna Petrig and
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2. Substantive Laws Addressing Sexual Violence
The Rome Statute incorporates a number of the normative and
practical advances in the prosecution of rape and sexual violence that
have developed within the last century. Specifically, it builds upon the
recognition of sexual violence as a serious international crime by the
Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals. 159
As mentioned, the Rome Statute also expands upon the list of
sexual violence-related crimes that are considered crimes against hu-
manity and war crimes, including sexual slavery, enforced prostitu-
tion, enforced sterilization, and forced pregnancy.16 0 Further, unlike
the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, which merely prohibit persecu-
tion on the basis of religion, politics, and/or race, the Court also pro-
hibits persecution based on gender, helping to ensure gender-related
crimes can be more expansively prosecuted than ever before.16 1
Another advancement is that the Rome Statute explicitly declares
rape to be a war crime-along with sexual slavery, forced pregnancy,
enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, persecution based on
gender, and other sexual violence.' 6 2 Finally, the Court has confirmed
that rape can constitute genocide by causing "serious bodily or mental
harm" committed with the intent to "destroy" a particular popula-
tion,163 codifying the holding in Akayesu.
Fausto Pocar, Case Referral to National jurisdictions: A Key Component of the ICTY Completion
Strategy, 45 CRIM. L. BULL. 1, 1-21 (2009). See also OPEN Soc'v FOUNDS., PUTTING COMPLE-
MENTARITY INTO PRACTICE: DOMESTIC JUSTICE FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES IN DRC, UGANDA,
AND KENYA (2011).
159. Rome Statute, supra note 133, arts. 7 (l) (g), 8(2) (b) (xxii), 8(2) (e) (vi); Ellis, supra
note 43, at 239.
160. Ellis, supra note 43, at 235.
161. Id. at 246; Richard J. Goldstone, Prosecuting Rape as a War Crime, 33 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L. L. 277 (2002). Proposals offered by the United States and Switzerland played a sig-
nificant role in developing the statutory prohibitions against these crimes, providing a
foundation for how they should be defined as war crimes in the Rome Statute, Herman van
Herbel, Introduction to Chapter 5: The Elements of War Crimes, in ICC ELEMENTS & RULES, supra
note 137, at 109, 109-11. Three proposals were similarly critical to the development of
these as crimes against humanity: one by the United States, one by a group of Arab states
(largely designed to protect longstanding cultural and religious norms regarding the rights
of husbands over wives), and one by Canada and Germany. Id. The nongovernmental Wo-
men's Caucus for Gender Justice also played a seminal role in helping to shape the ICC's
conceptualization of sexually violent crimes. DE BROUWER, supra note 137, at 20, 177-78;
Darryl Robinson, Article (1)(g)-Crime Against Humanity of Rape, in ICC ELEMENTS & RULES,
supra note 137, at 80, 93 n.80.
162. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 8(2) (b) (xxii).
163. Id. art. 6(b). It is explained in a footnote that rape can satisfy the elements of the
crime of genocide. Int'l Criminal Court, Elements of Crimes 2 n.3 (adopted and entered
into force Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Elements of Crimes], http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/
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The ICC's definition of rape builds on those used at the Rwanda
and Yugoslavia Tribunals. Specifically, article 7(1) (g)-1 "Crime against
humanity of rape" recognizes rape as having two elements:
1) The perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct result-
ing in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the
victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or
genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of
the body. 2) The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of
force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against
such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coer-
cive environment or the invasion was committed against a person
incapable of giving genuine consent. 16
4
This definition includes the elements of force and coercion re-
quired in Akayesu and Furundzija, however, it recognizes that coercion
can be shown by demonstrating that the individual who perpetrated
the crime took advantage of coercive circumstances.16 5 This signals an
additional step in the move away from the historic assumption of im-
plied consent by recognizing that in certain coercive situations, coer-
cion can be implied.' 6 6
As with the other tribunals, the ICC also provides for more than
just direct perpetration. Specifically, the Rome Statute recognizes a
variation on joint criminal enterprise (called "co-perpetration") and
superior (or "command") responsibility. Regarding co-perpetration,
article 25 states:
(2) A person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punish-
ment for a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court if that person:
(3) (a) commits such a crime, whether as an individual, jointly with
another or through another person, regardless of whether that
other person is criminally responsible . . . [or] (3) (d) in any other
way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of
such a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose.1 6 7
Meanwhile, article 28 explicitly declares that military com-
manders and other superiors can be held responsible for the acts of
the subordinates under their authority and control under certain cir-
rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-ABOB-68E5F9082543/0/Element-of CrimesEnglish.
pdf.
164. Elements of Crimes, supra note 163, at 8.
165. Ellis, supra note 43, at 240.
166. The Statute of the International Criminal Court Protects Against Sexual Crimes, CENTER
ON L. & GLOBALIZATION, http://clg.portalxm.com/library/keytext.cfm?keytext id=204
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
167. Rome Statute, supra note 133.
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cumstances.s68 This is particularly important for cases of sexual vio-
lence, where those who physically commit the crimes are often
relatively low on any chain of command and thus fall outside the
Court's mission to ensure accountability at the highest levels. Addi-
tionally, authorizing command responsibility improves the likelihood
that sexual violence can be recognized as a tool of warfare and notjust
a random crime of opportunity-and thus as an act either directly or
indirectly encouraged by leaders.
The ICC's decision to embrace these liability modes have likely
contributed, at least tangentially, to the United States' reluctance to
become a party to the Court's Rome Statute. While accountability for
the abuse of detainees has, so far, been limited to a few relatively low-
level soldiers in military courts, these modes would facilitate interna-
tional criminal prosecutions of those who knew of and/or authorized
the sexual abuse of detainees but did not prevent or punish such
abuse, including those who have served in some of the U.S. govern-
ment's most prominent positions.' 69
Finally, and especially importantly, the Rome Statute has a rela-
tively broad reparations provision underscoring its commitment to vic-
tims. The ICC is empowered to determine the extent of damages
suffered by victims1 70 and to order reparations against the accused, to
be coordinated by its Trust Fund for Victims.' 7 1 Such reparations can
include restitution, compensation, and/or rehabilitation.17 2 This var-
ies from many earlier international forums, such as the Yugoslavia Tri-
bunal, where victims typically had to sue in national court or
elsewhere to obtain compensation for the crimes they suffered.173
168. Id. art. 28(a).
169. For an overview of these various liability modes and their potential impact on
prosecutions, see ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 187-252 (2d ed. 2008).
170. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 75.
171. The Fund is a Court institution designed to assist the victims of those being tried
by the Court; its functions include the coordination and management of reparation
awards. See, e.g., Victims Trust Fund, COALITION INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.org/
?mod=trustfund (last visited March 16, 2011).
172. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 75. Restitution generally requires that a con-
victed party pay money damages to a victim equivalent to the amount by which he or she
was unjustly enriched by the crime. Compensation is an amount paid to compensate the
victim for his or her losses. Rehabilitation would likely be other damages designed to make
the victim or victims "whole," e.g., the provision of medical or psychological treatment.
173. CASSESE, supra note 169, at 422 & n.39. This commitment to provide reparations is
a particularly important advancement for victims, many of whom have stated a preferance
for obtaining reparations even over seeing perpetrators tried in court. This issue is critical
enough that it could easily fill (and deserves) an analysis of its own, and thus a careful
discussion of reparations is beyond the scope of this particular Article.
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3. Procedural Laws Addressing Sexual Violence
Several evidentiary rules establish how to deal with rape and sex-
ual violence cases in the ICC. For example, Rule 63 declares that the
Court's Chambers cannot require corroboration to prove any crime
within the Court's jurisdiction, particularly crimes of sexual vio-
lence. 17 4 This represents an explicit break from historic practices, in
which a woman's word was often not recognized as having sufficient
evidentiary weight to establish rape on its own. 1 7 5
Further, Rule 70 is dedicated to addressing evidentiary concerns
underlying the historically controversial issue of "consent." The issue
of whether a woman's consent could be introduced as a defense to
rape charges was hotly debated throughout the process of drafting the
Court's substantive and procedural rules. 176 The procedural rule that
resulted is divided into four key principles for adjudicating sexual vio-
lence. Specifically,
(a) Consent cannot be inferred by reason of any words or conduct
of a victim where force, threat of force, coercion or taking advan-
tage of a coercive environment undermined the victim's ability to
give voluntary and genuine consent; (b) Consent cannot be in-
ferred by reason of any words or conduct of a victim where the
victim is incapable of giving genuine consent; (c) Consent cannot
be inferred by reason of the silence of, or lack of resistance by, a
victim to the alleged sexual violence; [and] (d) Credibility, charac-
ter or predisposition to sexual availability of a victim or witness can-
not be inferred by reason of the sexual nature of the prior or
subsequent conduct of a victim or witness.1 7 7
While this rule discourages a consent defense, it also allows for
one in limited situations. This triggers an equally controversial issue:
when and how consent can be raised. During the Rules' drafting, Aus-
tralia proposed that the Chamber first determine in camera (privately,
in the judges' chambers) whether evidence of consent is relevant and
credible before such evidence can be introduced at trial.17 8 Some del-
egates, especially those from civil-law countries who had no experi-
ence with the provision of separate hearings to address whether
174. Int'l Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence Adopted by the Assembly
of States Parties, First Session, Official Records, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 63(4), at 22 (adopted
and entered into force Sept. 9, 2002) [hereinafter Rules of Procedure and Evidence], avail-
able at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/F1E0ACIC-A3F34ASC-B9A7-B3E8B115E8
86/140164/Rulesof.procedure andEvidence English.pdf.
175. See, e.g., ROSEMARIE TONG, WOMEN, SEX, AND THE LAw 104 (1984) (discussing re-
forms to corroboration requirements in rape cases).
176. Donald K. Piragoff, Evidence, in ICC ELEMENTS & RuLEs, supra note 137, at 369-71.
177. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 174, at 24.
178. Piragoff, supra note 176, at 373-74.
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particular evidence is admissible, were uncomfortable with the propo-
sal because they felt it would require the Chamber to make a partial
and advanced decision on the merits of the case without benefit of all
of the evidence that would be introduced in a full trial.179 However,
those arguing for in camera proceedings eventually won the debate,
supported by their argument that repeatedly questioning a victim in
court about his or her purported consent to sexual activity tends to
"blame and re-traumatise the victim."1 8 0
The resulting Rule 72 establishes:
Where there is an intention to introduce or elicit, including by
means of the questioning of a victim or witness, evidence that the
victim consented to an alleged crime of sexual violence, or evi-
dence of the words, conduct, silence or lack of resistance of a vic-
tim or witness ... notification shall be provided to the Court which
shall describe the substance of the evidence intended to be intro-
duced or elicited and the relevance of the evidence to the issues in
the case.18'
Once such notice is given, the Chamber is to consider in camera the
views of the Prosecutor, defense, witness, and victim or his or her legal
representative. The Chamber then weighs the probative value of the
evidence, as well as any potential prejudice. The Rule specifies that
the Chamber, in considering whether to admit the evidence, should
be guided by the principles laid out in Rule 70 regarding the limits on
establishing consent. If the Chamber decides the evidence is admissi-
ble, then the Chamber must state on the record the precise purpose
for which the evidence can be admitted.182
A fourth procedural rule, focused on whether a victim's sexual
history can be discussed at trial, also generated much debate. The re-
sulting rule ultimately went even further than the initial proposal,
which had duplicated procedural aspects of the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal.18 s While, as at the Yugoslavia Tribunal, Rule 71 forbids the intro-
duction of prior sexual conduct, the ICC now prohibits the
introduction of subsequent sexual conduct as well.184
The Rome Statute drafters were especially concerned about pro-
tecting victims and others who assisted the court. Importantly, when
179. Id. at 374.
180. Id. at 373.
181. Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 174, at 24 (Rule 72).
182. Id. at 25.
183. See Rules of Procedure & Evidence, Rule 96(iv), Iwr'L CluM. TRIBUNAL FORMER YUGO-
sLAvIA, (revised Dec. 8, 2010), http://www.icty.org/sid/136.
184. Rules of Procedure & Evidence, supra note 174, at 24 (Rule 71); Piragoff, supra
note 176, at 384.
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deciding whether special protections should be granted to victim wit-
nesses, the Court must specifically consider "the nature of the crime
[and] whether the crime involves sexual or gender violence."185 While
the anonymity of witnesses is not guaranteed, the Court can guarantee
confidentiality, meaning that witness's identities can be withheld from
the public, although not necessarily from the defense. Various elec-
tronic and other means have been provided to help safeguard confi-
dentiality. In addition to valuing security in its own right, the Court
recognizes security as necessary for establishing the "truth,"1 8 6 since
many victims and other witnesses may choose not to testify if sufficient
protections are not in place.
Finally, to help protect witnesses who may be especially vulnera-
ble, the Rome Statute requires that the prosecutor "appoint advisors
with legal expertise on specific issues, including sexual and gender
violence."187 In concordance with the Court's Victims and Witnesses
Unit (which is under the purview of the Registry), a Gender and Chil-
dren Unit in the Office of the Prosecutor is designed to help the pros-
ecution adequately address the specific issues faced by victims of
sexual violence.' 8 8
4. International Criminal Court Case Law
Several ICC arrest warrants have been sought on the basis of sex-
ual violence. They include, but have not been limited to, the follow-
ing: In Northern Uganda, charges against Joseph Kony include sexual
slavery and rape as crimes against humanity and rape as a war
crime.189 The Prosecutor has similarly sought charges against Vincent
Otti, also of Northern Uganda, for sexual slavery and rape as a war
185. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art, 68(1).
186. The Statute of the International Ciminal Court Protects Against Sexual Crimes, supra note
166.
187. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 42(9).
188. See Victims and Witness Background, COALYTION INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.iccnow.
org/?mod=victimsbackground (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Prof. Catharine A. MacKinnon
has been appointed the court's Special Adviser on Gender Crimes. Press Release, Int'l
Criminal Court, ICC Prosecutor Appoints Prof. Catharine A. MacKinnon as Special Adviser
on Gender Crimes (Nov. 26, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/Press+
and+Media/Press+Releases (follow "Press Releases (2008)" hyperlink). For additional
structures that have been put into place to assist victims, please see A.L.M. de Brouwer,
What the International Criminal Court Has Achieved and Can Achieve for Victims/survivors of Sex-
ual Violence, 16 INT'L REv. VicrMOLOGY 183, 183-209 (2009).
189. See, e.g., WOMEN'S INITIATIVES FOR GEND. JUSTICE, ADVANCING GENDER JUSTICE: A
CALL TO AcroN app. (2010), http://www.iccwomen.org/documents/Advancing-Gender-
Justice-A-Call-to-Action-FINAL.pdf [hereinafter ADVANCING GENDER JUSTICE]. For an over-
view of the ICC's current cases, see Prosecutions, INT'L CRIM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/
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crime.o90 In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Prosecutor has
sought charges against Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui
for sexual slavery and rape, both as a war crime and crime against
humanity.191 Similar charges have been sought against defendants in
Darfur, including "genocide based on rape and sexual assault" (Omar
Hassan Ahmad Al'Bashir) and persecution by rape and outrages upon
personal dignity constituting a crime against humanity (Ali Muham-
mad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman).192 ICC arrest warrants have also been issued
for Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb for crimes-including rape-com-
mitted in Darfur.193 Finally, Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo is currently be-
ing tried for crimes committed in the Central African Republic' 94
(discussed below), while several arrest warrants have been issued in
relation to the Situation in Kenya (also discussed below).
However, in the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the first ICC case
to go to trial, the prosecutors failed to charge the defendant with sex-
ual violence, despite the fact that "witness after witness" testified to the
repeated rape of young girl soldiers by their commanders. 95 In May
2010, the lawyers for ninety-nine victim participants petitioned the
Court to consider additional charges against the accused, including
sexual slavery and cruel and unusual treatment, to reflect the routine
rape of child soldiers.' 96 Ultimately, despite the Lead Prosecutor's
opening pledge that "in this court . .. girl victims will not be invisible,"
the request to expand the charges against Lubanga to include sexual
Menus/ICC/Structure+of+the+Court/Office+of+the+Prosecutor/Prosecutions/ (last vis-
ited March 18 2011).
190. ADVANCING GENDER JUSTICE, supra note 189, app. at 8.
191. Id. at app.
192. Id. See also Prosecutions, supra note 189.
193. See, e.g., Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Prosecutor Briefs UN Security Coun-
cil, Calls for the Arrest of Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb for Crimes in Darfur, ICC-)TP-
PR-20070607-222 (May 2, 2007); ICC Issues Darfur Arrest Warrants, BBC (May 2, 2007),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6614903.stm.
194. The International Criminal Court Bares its Teeth, THE ECoNOMIsT, May 12, 2011, avail-
able at http://www.economist.com/node/18682044?story-id=18682044&fsrc=rss.
195. Lisa Gambone, Failure to Charge: The ICC, Lubanga & Sexual Violence Crimes in the
DRC, WAR CIUMEs: WORLD AFFs. BLOC NETWORK (July 22, 2009 9:00 AM), http://war-
crimes.foreignpolicyblogs.com/2009/07/22/failure-to-charge-the-icc-lubanga-sexual-vio-
lence-crimes-in-the-drc.
196. Id. Many girl soldiers have been required to play multiple roles. Radhika
Coomaraswamy, UN Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, has reported
that the girl soldiers she interviewed in the DRC "spoke of being used as fighters one
minute, a 'wife' or 'sex slave' the next, and domestic servants and food-providers at other
times." Katy Glassborow, Call for Lubanga Charges to Cover Rape, INsT. WAR & PEACE REPORT-
ING (May 12, 2008), http://iwpr.net/report-news/call-lubanga-charges-cover-rape.
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and gender-based violence was rejected.197 Although two of the three
Trial Chamber judges had agreed to recharacterize the charges, their
decision was later overturned by the Appeals Chamber.198 While the
appellate judges acknowledged the Trial Chamber may "change the
legal characterisation of facts," the Trial Chamber cannot "exceed [ ]
the facts and circumstances described in the charges and any amend-
ments to the charges."199 From a victim's perspective, this controver-
sial interpretation of Court regulations underscores the need for
more effective advocacy on behalf of victims at the earliest stage of
proceedings, to ensure their interests and experiences are adequately
reflected in the initial charges.2 0 0
The Court will finally have its first opportunity to consider rape
charges in the case ofJean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, whose trial began in
November 2010.201 The Court's Pre-Trial Chamber II authorized the
prosecution to pursue charges of rape as a crime against humanity,
based on evidence of "widespread and systematic rape in [Bemba's]
role as former President and Commander-in-chief of the Movement
for the Liberation of Congo"2 0 2 in the Central African Republic. Vic-
tims' advocates, while supporting these charges, have criticized the
Pre-Trial Chamber II's decision to refuse to allow charges for outrages
upon personal dignity and torture based on mass rapes as a distinct
charge (the Pre-Trial Chamber II subsumed the torture charges into
the charge of rape as a crime against humanity).203 Such advocates
believe Bemba should have to defend against both since the two
crimes have distinct elements, although the Pre-Trial Chamber de-
clined to adopt this reasoning "as a matter of fairness and expeditious-
197. Sexual Violence Against Girl Soldiers, AEGIS (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.aegistrust.
org/Lubanga-Chronicles/backgrounder-sexual-violence-against-girl-soldiers.html (online
video).
198. Background, LUBANGA TRIAL INT'L CIUM. CT., http://www.lubangatrial.org/back-
ground (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
199. Int'l Criminal Court, Regulations of the Court Adopted by the Judges of the Court
on 26 May 2004, Fifth Plenary Session The Hague 17-28 May 2004, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Reg-
ulation 55(1), at 32 (May 26, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/B9
20AD62-DF49-4010-8907-EOD8CC61EBA4/277527/Regulations of theCourt_170604EN.
pdf. See also Amy Senier, The ICC Appeals Chamber judgment on the Legal Characterization of the
Facts in Prosecutor v. Lubanga, ASIL INSIGIrr, http://www.asil.org/files/insightl00108pdf.
pdf.
200. See Senier, supra note 199.
201. Bemba Trial Begins 22 November 2010, ACCESS: Vicnus' RTs. WORKING GROUP
But-., Winter 2010, at 1-2.
202. Id. at 2.
203. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC01/05-01/08, 1 71-72 (June 15, 2009), availa-
ble at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc699541.pdf.
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ness."204 At least one critic has voiced her concern that the Pre-Trial
Chamber's refusal to view these as separate crimes has begun a
"recharacterization" of rape and torture in the Court, and possibly in
international jurisprudence more broadly, while another has ex-
plained that the Chamber's refusal to allow both charges overlooks
the experience of victims, who experienced mass rapes both as a crime
against humanity and as a form of public torture designed to terrorize
the local population.205 At the very least, however, the Bemba case will
allow the world its first glimpse into how the Court will handle rape
charges in practice.
A second opportunity may arise in the context of an investigation
into sexual violence purportedly committed in Kenya. In December
2007, the election of incumbent Kenyan President Mwai Kibaki re-
sulted in an eruption of ethnic and political violence, resulting in
widespread displacement as well as hundreds of reported deaths and
incidents of sexual violence.206 In order to address the atrocities that
occurred, the Waki Commission of Inquiry was established, and the
Kenyan government agreed to the development of a Special Tribunal
to investigate and prosecute any crimes that had been committed. 207
The Special Tribunal, however, was never realized. In the absence of
state action, on November 5, 2009, Court Lead Prosecutor Luis
Moreno-Ocampo alerted the Court President, Judge Sang-Hyun Song,
that he had determined that there was "a reasonable basis to proceed
with an investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya in
relation to the post-election violence."208 On November 6, 2009, the
situation was assigned to Pre-Trial Chamber 11.209 The Pre-Trial Chain-
204. Maria McDonald, Rape and Torture Charges in the Case AgainstJean-Pierre Bemba, AC-
CESS: Vicrims' RTs. WORKING GROUP BULL., Winter 2010, at 4-5.
205. Mariana Goetz, Interview with Maitre Marie-Edith Douzima, Lauryer and Victims' Repre-
sentative in the Bemba Case, ACCESS: ViCns' RTs. WORKING GROUP BULL., Winter 2010, at 3;
see also Press Release, Statement by the Women's Initiatives for Gender Justice on the
Opening of the ICC Trial of Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo (Nov. 22, 2010) (statement of
Brigid Inder, Exec. Dir., Women's Initiatives for Gend. Justice).
206. COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE PosT-ELECrION VIOLENCE, REPORT ON Posr ELEC-
TION VIOLENCE, at vii-ix (2008), http://www.communication.go.ke/media.asp?id=739. See
also Antonina Okuta, National Legislation for Prosecution of International Crimes in Kenya, 7 J.
INT'L GIuM. JUsT. 1063, 1064 (2009), available at http://jicj.oxfordjoumals.org/content/7/
5/1063.full.pdf+html.
207. Id. at 18-19.
208. Letter from Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to Sang-Hyun Song, Int'l Criminal
Court President (Nov. 5, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc7782
45.pdf.
209. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, ICC-01/09, Decision Assigning the Situation
in the Republic of Kenya to Pre-Trial Chamber II (Nov. 6, 2009), available at http://
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc778243.pdf.
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ber ultimately concluded there was a reasonable basis to believe that
the Kenyan population had been the victim of several crimes against
humanity, specifically murder, the deportation and forcible transfer
of populations, rape and other sexual violence, and additional inhu-
mane acts.210 On March 31, 2010, the Pre-Trial Chamber granted
Moreno-Ocampo permission to begin his investigation.211 With that
permission, the investigation became the fifth under the Court's au-
thority and the first as an investigation proprio motu-one that is re-
quested on the Prosecutor's own initiative.212
The Pre-Trial Chamber explained that evidence of rape and
other forms of sexual violence would be evaluated based on the defini-
tion provided in the ICC's Element of Crimes, namely penetration of
any part of the victim's body with a sexual organ, or penetration of the
victim's anus or genitals with any part of the perpetrator's body or a
foreign object. 213 To establish sexual violence as a crime against hu-
manity, the prosecution must establish that the perpetrator "commit-
ted an act of a sexual nature against one or more persons or caused
such person or persons to engage in an act of a sexual nature by force,
or by threat of force or coercion" in the context of a widespread and/
or systematic attack against a civilian population.214
Ultimately, the prosecutor sufficiently demonstrated that "numer-
ous incidents of sexual violence including rape of men and women"
had occurred.215 Specifically, the Pre-Trial Chamber relied on evi-
dence that the Kenya Police Crime Record detailed "876 cases of rape
and 1,984 cases of defilement" in 2007.216 Between the end of Decem-
ber 2007 and February 29, 2008-a period of just two months-the
Nairobi Women's Hospital's Gender Violence Recovery Centre
"treated 443 survivors of sexual and gender based violence, 80 percent
of which were rape or defilement cases."217 From January 2008
210. Kenya Decision, supra note 154, f 73, 102. The Pre-Trial Chamber was careful to
limit the scope of the investigation substantively, temporally, and geographically. Moreno-
Ocampo is only permitted to investigate (1) crimes against humanity, (2) crimes that oc-
curred between the Rome State's entry into force in Kenya on June 1, 2005 and November
26, 2009, and (3) crimes that took place within the Republic of Kenya. Id. IT 94, 173, 175.
211. Am. NoN-GOVERNMENTAL ORGS. COAL. FOR THE INT'L CRIMINAL COURT (AMICC),
ICC PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER APPROVES PROSECUTOR'S INVESTIGATION IN THE KENYA SITUATION 1
(2010).
212. Id.
213. Elements of Crimes, supra note 163, at 8 (art. 7(1)(g)-1(1)).
214. Id. at 10 (art. 7(1)(g)-6(1)).
215. Kenya Decision, supra note 154, 152-53.
216. Id. 1 154.
217. Id.
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through March 2008, the Nairobi Women's Hospital and other local
partner hospitals took in "at least" 900 sexual violence cases. The Pre-
Trial Chamber also noted the "high" number of documented gang
rapes and the brutality of such rapes, which included cutting and in-
serting weapons and other foreign objects into women's vaginas. 218
The devastating impact on victims was reported as especially se-
vere among sexual violence victims, who were alleged to have exper-
ienced "psychological trauma, social stigma, abandonment, and being
infected with HIV/AIDS." 2 1 9 Victims were also alleged to have been
impregnated and/or otherwise subjected to rape and sexual violence,
as well as forced into transactional sex and sexual exploitation while
in internally-displaced persons camps. 220
On December 15, 2010, Moreno-Ocampo announced that he had
asked the Pre-Trial Chamber II to issue summonses to appear for six
Kenyan politicians whom he suspected may have been at least partially
responsible for these crimes. 2 2 1 The six suspects include William
Samoei Ruto (Kenya's Minister of Higher Education, Science and
Technology (suspended), Henry Kiprono Kosgey (Minister of Indus-
trialization), Joshua Arap Sang (Head of Operations for KASS FM),
Francis Kirimi Muthaura (Head of the Public Service and Secretary to
the Cabinet and Chairman of the National Security Advisory Commit-
tee), Uhuru Muigai Kenyatta (Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of
Finance), and Mohamed Hussein Ali (Chief Executive of the Postal
Corporation of Kenya and previously Commissioner of the Kenya Po-
lice) 222 The Court's Pre-Trial Chamber II has since found reasonable
grounds to believe four of the six men are criminally responsible as
indirect co-perpetrators and two of the six men otherwise contributed
to the commission of various crimes related to the Kenyan post-elec-
tion violence;223 on March 8, 2011 the Pre-Trial Chamber issued sum-




221. Press Release, Int'l Criminal Court, Kenya's Post Election Violence: ICC Prosecu-




223. Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Iwr'L GIuM. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/
ICC/Situations+and+Cases/Situations/Situation+ICC+0109/Situation+Index.htm (last vis-
ited May 12, 2011).
224. Background, INT'L CluM. CT. KENYA MONITOR, http://www.icckenya.org/back-
ground/timeline (last visited May 12, 2011).
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filed two petitions challenging the International Criminal Court's in-
volvement in the cases against these suspects. 2 2 5
While at the time of writing this Article, the Kenya cases are still
in the pre-trial phase, they have the potential to establish key interna-
tional jurisprudence on sexual violence because of the large number
of sexual-violence-related charges being considered. Building upon
the prior jurisprudence of the Rwanda and Yugoslavia Tribunals, the
ICC represents a relatively new and expansive mechanism through
which perpetrators may be held accountable for acts of sexual vio-
lence and through which victims may be granted a voice. However,
ICC prosecutions will not be enough to ensure accountability on their
own; to reverse the current apparent impunity for sexual violence, it is
important that various nations of the world incorporate the ICC's pro-
visions into their own legal systems when more expansive than their
own, to facilitate prosecutions based on national and international
law.
IV. Challenges for Domestic Legal Systems
The ICC's accomplishments can be seen as part of a broad-based
effort to adequately address rape and sexual violence at both the in-
ternational and domestic levels. Several countries that have recently
engaged with the ICC provide notable examples of the ways in which
domestic legal systems can implement the jurisprudential frameworks
necessary to effectuate the prosecution of international crimes at the
domestic level. Their advances may prove informative for the United
States even if the United States never ratifies the Rome Statute, since
their efforts model the ways in which the international laws and norms
favoring increased accountability may be encouraged domestically, in-
cluding in nations hostile to the idea of their leaders being prose-
cuted in an international tribunal. Kenya and Uganda are particularly
notable examples of countries that have been working on developing
the domestic jurisprudential framework necessary to effectuate the
prosecution of international crimes in a domestic setting, by adopting
the legal norms currently being promulgated by the ICC.
225. See Press Release, Coal. for the Int'l Criminal Court, Kenyan Government Chal-
lenges ICC Involvement in Post-Election Violence Case (April 1, 2011), available at http://
coalitionfortheicc.org/documents/Kenya~article 19_CICC-advisoryj1041l.pdf. The En-
glish version of the first petition, the "Application on Behalf of the Government of the
Republic of Kenya Pursuant to Article 19 of the ICC Statute," March 31, 2011, is available
through the International Criminal Court Website at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/
doc1050005.pdf. The English version of the second petition, filed on the same date, is
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1050028.pdf.
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As discussed above, Kenya has been subject to ICC attention fol-
lowing the widespread incidents of post-election violence in 2007.
Prior to the 2007 violence, Kenyan law had incorporated some provi-
sions of international law, namely through the creation of domestic
human-rights protections in alignment with international norms. For
example, Kenyan citizens are constitutionally protected from torture,
inhuman treatment, and degrading punishment.226 Specific protec-
tions for the incorporation of international crimes of sexual violence,
however, have historically been limited.
International crimes-including crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide-were first addressed in Kenyan courts follow-
ing Kenya's ratification of the Rome Statute in 2005.227 Although
there was little political will at the time to actively incorporate the
ICC's standards into domestic law, Kenya did begin the process of
adopting implementing legislation via the drafting of a comprehen-
sive International Crimes Bill.2 28 However, with the presidential elec-
tion looming, consideration of the bill by the parliament was
postponed, and any prospect of its enactment was suspended in
2007.229 Only after the 2007 post-election violence did the Kenyan
government hastily agree to establish the Special Tribunal recom-
mended by the Waki Commission to address the dearth of Kenyan
legislation related to the prosecution of crimes recognized in interna-
tional law.2 30
In addition to the agreement to establish a Special Tribunal, Ke-
nya also drafted a "Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill," or Draft Statute,
which was meant to govern crimes within the tribunal's jurisdiction.231
The Special Tribunal Bill was progressive legislation seeking to align
Kenyan law with international criminal-law norms, thereby allowing
for effective prosecution within the tribunal itself. Perhaps most signif-
icantly, section 43(3) of the bill provided that where international
norms were inconsistent with any other written law, the international
226. CONsTITUTION, art. 25(a) (2010) (Kenya).
227. See Okuta, supra note 206, at 1063.
228. Id. at 1064.
229. Id.
230. Following the post-election violence, the Kenyan Commission of Inquiry recom-
mended that the country prosecute those who had violated international norms, but Kenya
had no laws in place through which to do so. The Kenyan Penal Code did not contain any
provisions that define or provide for penalties for international crimes. Id. at 1065.
231. Id. at 1066. Specifically, the Draft Statute granted the tribunal jurisdiction to con-
sider crimes against humanity, genocide, gross violations of human rights, and other
crimes committed in relation to the 2007 general election. Id.
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norm would prevail.232 This was a significant departure from the prior
jurisprudence of the Kenyan High Court-which had previously pri-
oritized domestic law-and was believed to constitute an "important
milestone and an acceptance by the Kenyan legal order that norms of
international law had to be taken into account and could at times pre-
vail over domestic law."2 33
Following delay in adopting the Special Tribunal Bill, 2 3 4 in De-
cember 2008, the Kenyan government successfully adopted the Inter-
national Crimes Act, which incorporated many of the Special Tribunal
Bill's provisions.235 The content of the act mirrors much of the Rome
Statute and is designed "to make provision for the punishment of cer-
tain international crimes, namely genocide, crimes against humanity
and war crimes, and to enable Kenya to co-operate with the Interna-
tional Criminal Court."23 6 It does not define international crimes on
its own but instead refers to the Rome Statute. 237 The Act further stip-
ulates that any provisions of the Kenyan Penal Code that may be in-
consistent should not apply.238 The Act also makes certain provisions
of the Rome Statute directly applicable for purposes of proceedings
for an international offense, including article 28,239 article 29,240 and
article 33.241
Kenya's adoption of the International Crimes Act specifically pro-
vides for the domestic use of the Rome Statute. Because "rape, sexual
slavery ... or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity"
are considered "crimes against humanity" by the Rome Statute, this
Act could give rise to co-perpetration prosecutions when there was an
232. Id. at 1068.
233. Okuta, supra note 206, at 1069.
234. In order to ensure the constitutionality of the Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill, a
complementary Constitutional Amendment Bill was also drafted, which attempted to
amend the constitution by providing parliament with the ability to establish a Special Tri-
bunal. Id. at 1069. This Constitutional Amendment Bill was rejected by the Kenyan Parlia-
ment, requiring a reformulated approach, the International Crimes Act, which was
eventually successful. Id. at 1072.
235. Id.
236. International Crimes Act, (2008) Preamble (Kenya).
237. Id. at Cap. I § 5.
238. Id. at Cap. 2 § 7(5)(b).
239. Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 28 (relating to the responsibility of com-
manders and other superiors).
240. Id. art. 29 (excluding any statute of limitations).
241. Id. art. 33 (relating to superior orders). Interestingly, the International Crimes Act
gives the Kenyan Courts jurisdiction over an individual who, after committing any of the
offenses under the Act, is present in Kenya, thus applying what can be seen as an element
of universal jurisdiction to the Act and Kenya's prosecution of international crimes. Inter-
national Crimes Act, (2008) Cap. 1, § 8 (Kenya).
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objective to commit sexually violent crimes. 242 In this way, Kenya's in-
corporation of the provisions and jurisprudence of the ICC as they
relate to rape and sexual violence can supplement its own national
Sexual Offences Act 2 4 3 and facilitate complementary prosecutions at
the domestic level. If ICC interpretations are enforced effectively and
taken in conjunction with the International Crimes Act, Kenyans may
find that their government has successfully aligned much of its domes-
tic jurisprudence with international efforts to raise accountability for
acts of sexual violence.
As the Kenyan example illustrates, efforts to effectively prosecute
crimes of sexual violence on a significant scale frequently require both
domestic criminal legislation, like a Sexual Offences Act, and legisla-
tion to incorporate international criminal norms. While domestic im-
plementation of ICC provisions remains limited globally, Kenya is not
without counterparts. Currently, thirty-one African states are parties to
the Rome Statute, and three countries from the Great Lakes Region-
Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, and
Uganda-have engaged in self-referrals to the ICC prosecutor.2 4 4 Of
the thirty-one African states, several have attempted to initiate domes-
tic investigations and prosecutions intended to supplement (and in
some cases, challenge) any ICC prosecutions. 245 To date, these coun-
tries' efforts have met with mixed results.
Uganda, for example, has spent several years attempting to inte-
grate the Rome Statute into domestic legislation, in part to incorpo-
rate shifting international norms into its domestic framework.
Although Uganda signed the Rome Statute in 1999 and ratified it in
2002, it did not immediately develop implementing legislation.246 In-
242. See Rome Statute, supra note 133, art. 7 (l)(g).
243. See Sexual Offences Act, (2006) Cap. 3 (Kenya). It should be noted that this adop-
tion is not synonymous with implementation or effective regulation. Despite the develop-
ment of the International Crimes Act, Kenya received a great deal of negative attention in
August 2010 when the country failed to arrest Omar Al-Bashir while he was on a visit to the
country. See Int'l Justice Desk, Al-Bashir Rains on Kenya's Party, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE
(Sept. 6, 2010 10:22 AM), http://www.rnw.nl/international-justice/article/al-bashir-rains-
kenya's-party. Al-Bashir, president of Sudan, currently has an international warrant for his
arrest from the ICC for crimes against humanity and war crimes. Id. Despite widespread
agreement that Kenya had an international legal obligation to cooperate in enforcing the
warrant, they failed to do so. Id.
244. DAPo AKANDE ET AL., INST. FOR SEC. STUDIEs, AN AFRicAN EXPERT STUDY ON THE
AFRICAN UNION CONCERNS ABOUT ARICLE 16 OF THE ROME STATUTE OF THE ICC, at 7
(2010).
245. MAKING KAMPALA COUNT, supra note 150, at 19.
246. PUB. INTEREST LAW AND POUCY GRP. ET AL., OUTREACH STRATEGY FOR WAR CRIMES
DIVIsION OF HIGH COURT OF UGANDA (2010) [hereinafter PILPG REPORT]; Uganda, INT'L
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stead, Uganda self-referred its situation to the ICC, which issued arrest
warrants with the intention of investigating the situation to the great-
est of its abilities. 247 In 2008, however, the Ugandan government re-
versed the forward march toward ICC prosecutions by agreeing to the
development of a domestic court-the War Crimes Division of the High
Court-to address international crimes.248 In June 2010, indicating its
intent to challenge ICC jurisdiction over the Uganda situation,
Uganda formally incorporated the Rome Statute into Ugandan law
through its International Criminal Court Act.249 Like Kenya's Interna-
tional Crimes Act, the International Criminal Court Act formally rec-
ognizes the international violations of crimes against humanity, war
crimes, and genocide and provides that the War Crimes Division will
have jurisdiction over these crimes. Uganda is set to begin its first war-
crime trial in the coming months in the prosecution of Thomas
Kweyolo, a former Lords Resistance Army commander. 2 5 0 Although
Kweyolo is not himself charged with crimes of sexual violence, several
other Lords Resistance Army commanders, including Joseph Kony,
face charges of sexual enslavement, rape, and sexual violence.251
Despite the relatively successful efforts of countries such as Kenya
and Uganda to incorporate international criminal law-including
provisions of the Rome Statute-into their domestic legislation,
thereby facilitating the diffusion of emerging international norms,
many nations continue to hold divergent views on conceptualizing the
act of rape, defining consent and coercion, and addressing sexual as-
sault. Indeed, the crime of sexual assault is gaining recognition as a
critical tool for combating sexual violence and is particularly impor-
tant for nations to recognize because of the need of many jurisdic-
tions to use sexual assault provisions to prosecute several less-
recognized forms of sexual violence, including sexual violence di-
rected at men. At its most basic level, sexual assault is commonly de-
fined as "sexual aggression that does not involve penetration."252 This
Cium. CT., http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/Uganda.htm
(last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
247. PILPG REPORT, supra note 246, at 14-15.
248. Id. at 16.
249. Luke Moffett, The Ugandan International Criminal Court Act 2010: What does it mean




250. PILPG REPORT, supra note 246, at 17.
251. Id. at 14-16.
252. ELIZABETH BARAD & ELISA SLATTERY, GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE LAWS IN SUB-
SAHARN AvIcA 32 (2007).
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definition, however, is at best ambiguous and, at worst, unworkable in
the context of a criminal trial, which typically requires precise defini-
tions for effective prosecution. Perhaps unsurprisingly, many coun-
tries, when recognizing the crime of sexual assault, tend to do so
indirectly.25 3 Indeed, among the sub-Saharan African countries, only
South Africa has directly addressed the offense within its legisla-
tion.254 There, the crime has been defined expansively, including con-
tact between genital organs, the mouth, any other area of the body
resulting in sexual stimulation, any object used for sexual purposes,
and sexual contact with an animal. 25 5 Such an expansive understand-
ing of sexual assault has many advantages. First, it is gender-neutral
with respect to both victim and perpetrator. Second, "it accepts that
purposefully inspiring in a victim the belief that he or she will be sexu-
ally assaulted should also be punishable."256 Third, by carefully de-
lineating what actions constitute sexual assault, it increases the power
of the statute by more clearly illustrating the difference between sex-
ual assault and rape.257
253. Id.
254. Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007
§§ 5-7, 16 (S. Afr.).
255. Specifically, "sexual violation" is defined as:
(a) direct or indirect contact between the-
(i) genital organs or anus of one person or, in the case of a female, her
breasts, and any part of the body of another person or an animal, or any
object, including any object resembling or representing the genital or-
gans or anus of a person or an animal;
(ii) mouth of one person and-
(aa). the genital organs or anus of another person or, in the case of a
female, her breasts;
(bb). the mouth of another person;
(cc). any other part of the body of another person, other than the geni-
tal organs or anus of that person or, in the case of female, her
breasts, which could-
(aaa). be used in an act of sexual penetration; or
(bbb). cause sexual arousal or stimulation or
(ccc). be sexually aroused or stimulated thereby or;
(dd). any object resembling the genital organs or anus of a person, and
in the case of a female, her breasts, or an animal; or
(iii) the mouth of the complainant and the genital organs or anus of an
animal;
(b) the masturbation of one person by another person; or
(c) the insertion of any object resembling or representing the genital organs of a
person or animal, into or beyond the mouth of another person.
Id § 1.
256. BARAD & SLATTERY, sup-a note 252, at 35.
257. There are also extensive comparisons on the nature of domestic violence statutes
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Id.
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Ultimately, building upon the efforts of the Rwanda and Yugosla-
via Tribunals, as well as advances realized in the Rome Statute, Kenya
and its neighbors continue to make significant strides toward imple-
menting a domestic legal framework through which to prosecute and
redress sexual offences that occur during periods of war and political
unrest. At a minimum, their example provides an important model
for reconciling domestic with international law and signaling to the
world community that they are capable and willing to facilitate ac-
countability through domestic mechanisms. While challenges remain,
such domestic initiatives, in combination with the ongoing efforts of
the international community, should continue to help foster an ever-
stronger and more effective framework for prosecuting sexual vio-
lence around the world.
Conclusion
Over the last several decades, the international community has
grappled with several issues that must be considered as various na-
tions-including the United States-continue to struggle with
whether and how to effectively address war-related sexual violence
through legal mechanisms. The birth of the International Criminal
Court in 2002258 offered an opportunity to begin to strengthen ac-
countability for sexual violence in an international forum, while simul-
taneously encouraging the diffusion of relatively recent substantive
developments to domestic legal systems. Indeed, this unprecedented
institution-designed to establish a means to prosecute the perpetra-
tors of the most significant international crimes, including crimes of
sexual violence-has refined the definitions of rape and sexual vio-
lence established by earlier international tribunals with an eye toward
improving accountability. Through the Rome Statute, various acts of
sexual violence have gained prominence as named crimes. At the
same time, the Court has endeavored to broaden popular understand-
ings of the categories of individuals who might be recognized as vic-
tims, including men.
However, the ICC's jurisdiction is limited, ensuring that most
cases of sexual violence will never be eligible for consideration by the
Court. And many nations, including the United States, will probably
never ratify the Court's Rome Statute in an attempt to fall outside its
258. As explained above, while the Court was established in 1998, in 2002 the Court's
founding treaty, the Rome Statute, entered into force. See discussion supra Part III.
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jurisdictional scope.259 Indeed, the United States has gone so far as to
secure bilateral immunity agreements with other countries to try to
shield U.S. citizens and employees from the Court's jurisdiction, even
imposing economic penalties on those countries that refuse to sign. 26 0
These agreements "provide that current or former U.S. government
officials, military and other personnel (regardless of whether or not
they are nationals of the state concerned, i.e., foreign sub-contractors
working for the U.S.) and U.S. nationals would [never] be transferred
to the jurisdiction of the ICC."261 In addition, the ICC is limited by the
doctrine of complementarity and the mandate that it only prosecute
crimes of "sufficient gravity," as well as structural capacity and re-
source limitations. As such, the ICC cannot assume full accountability
for enforcing international norms against sexual violence; thus it is
crucial that individual nations do their part to complement the
Court's work.
First, the United States and other nations can and should imple-
ment legislation to fully adopt the Rome Statute's gender and sexual-
violence provisions when those provisions are more expansive or pro-
tective than existing legislation. For states that are a party to the Rome
Statute, implementing the elements of crimes and rules of procedure
and evidence will be particularly beneficial. Not only will this help to
ensure that domestic laws are as protective of victims' rights as inter-
national law, but such legislation has the potential to streamline pros-
ecution and enforcement by ensuring consistency among
jurisdictions. In the absence of the United States becoming a party to
the Rome Statute, the United States can and should review current
legislation, including its military codes, to ensure its prohibitions
against sexual violence are no less stringent than the laws currently
promulgated by the International Criminal Court. Of course, such
prohibitions will only prove effective to the extent that they are used
to establish a basis for prosecutions; indeed, a clear effort on the part
of the United States (and other nations that have refused to ratify the
Rome Statute) to engage in domestic investigations and prosecutions
has tremendous potential to deflate international criticism, as well as
calls for some form of international accountability.
259. See, e.g., Monroe Leigh, The United States and the Statute of Rome, 95 AM.J. INT'L L.
124 (2001).
260. Status ofUS Bilateral Immunity Agreements (BIAs), COALITION INT'L CIUM. CT., http://
www.iccnow.org/documents/CICCFS-BIAstatusCurrent.pdf (last visited March 17, 2011).
261. Id.
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Second, courts and the nations that house them must be recep-
tive to changing understandings of the nature of sexual violence, as
well as the nature of its victims. While courts are not the only mecha-
nisms through which sexual violence can and should be addressed,
law plays an important role in structuring how sexual offences are
conceptualized. Courts and other institutions charged with develop-
ing relevant law may find it necessary to consider (1) broader under-
standings of "who" constitutes a victim, including men and children;
(2) the issue of secondary victimization, including the impact on those
closely affiliated to victims, such as victims' children, spouses and sur-
rounding communities; (3) the needs of children born of rape and
forced pregnancies; (4) looking beyond rape and sexual violence to
address sexual assault and domestic violence; (5) the realities of force
and violence, which may blur and/or negate consent; and (6) the
most effective means to empower victims through the advancement of
sexual violence laws and policies, including opportunities for repara-
tions. Abuses committed at Abu Ghraib and Guantinamo, as well as
other military sites, particularly underscore the need to consider men
as potential victims and the complexities that arise when women are
among the possible perpetrators. 262
Further complicating the possibility of prosecutions for sexual vi-
olence at Guantinamo and other military facilities are the intercul-
tural nature of the violence and cross-cultural differences in
perception, issues that have yet to be adequately addressed injurispru-
dence and secondary literatures. For example, several of the sexual-
ized acts perpetrated by American soldiers, such as lap dances
performed on detainees, may have been considered relatively tame by
Western standards but were experienced as especially harmful by
many Muslim detainees. This raises the question: Whose standards
should be prioritized when establishing the gravity of an act? In addi-
tion, the ambiguous purpose of some practices complicates the issue
of accountability. Interviews conducted by researchers at U.C. Berke-
ley and the University of San Francisco with former detainees,263 for
instance, have revealed that many detainees believe they were raped
262. For example, one question this raises is whether military personnel who are en-
couraged to commit sexual violence against detainees are, themselves, being coerced into
such activity, and thus also being victimized by the state.
263. The U.C. Berkeley interviews were led by Laurel E. Fletcher, Director of the Inter-
national Human Rights Law Clinic, and Eric Stover, Faculty Director of the Human Rights
Center, while the University of San Francisco interviews are currently being conducted by
law professor Peter Jan Honigsberg through the Witness to Guantdnamo Project. WrTNEss
To GuAr/WAMo, http://witnesstoguantanamo.com (last visited May 12, 2011).
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while in U.S. custody.26 Several of these incidents appear to have ac-
tually been prostate exams or cavity searches conducted by medical
military personnel.265 However, when soldiers do not communicate
what they are doing to detainees' bodies or why and fail to employ
adequate translation staff, the perceptions of populations who have
had little to no previous exposure to such practices may understanda-
bly differ from those of U.S. personnel. And when such practices are
conducted in a manner that is especially rough (as typically occurred
during intake procedures designed to establish U.S. authority and
control over incoming detainees and terrorize detainees into submis-
sion), the reality of whether these are 'just" cavity searches or might
also be conceptualized as rape becomes an important question.266
While international law has demonstrated its willingness and (less
frequently) its ability to address and prosecute an increasingly expan-
sive variety of sex-related crimes, the efforts of the international com-
munity to grapple with questions such as the ones posed above and to
facilitate prosecutions when appropriate, are and will continue to be
most effective when coupled with investigations and prosecutions con-
ducted by national governments. Encouraged by advances made in
the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and International Criminal
Court, an increasing number of countries, including Kenya and
Uganda, have begun to address war-related rape and sexual violence
through their domestic jurisprudence, tackling definitional issues and
procedural hurdles to create systems that have the potential to protect
and redress victims. Indeed, without international and national prose-
cutions, the vast majority of offenders will continue to enjoy impunity
for their crimes. This is certainly true in cases involving American per-
sonnel, whose actions are considered by many to be beyond the reach
of the International Criminal Court, and frequently perceived as
outside the jurisdiction of even the United States' Article III courts.
In light of apparent U.S. reluctance to ensure adequate domestic
accountability for sexual violence and other abuses purportedly com-
mitted during the War on Terror, efforts to ensure international ac-
countability will inevitably persist. For example, on February 7, 2011,
it was announced that former President George W. Bush had can-
264. See, e.g., K. Alexa Koenig, 'The Worst": Institutional Cruelty, Resistance and the
Law (forthcoming dissertation, University of California, Berkeley School of Law) (analyz-
ing interviews conducted with former Guantdnamo detainees through U.C. Berkeley and
through the Witness to GuantAnamo Project) (on file with author).
265. Id
266. Id.
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celled a planned trip to Geneva, due in part to the anticipated filing
of a criminal complaint in Swiss courts for his alleged participation in
the torture of detainees.267 Drafted by the Center for Constitutional
Rights and other human-rights and humanitarian organizations, 268
the complaint alleged that the former president's involvement in the
treatment of detainees violated the Convention Against Torture. 269
While the complaint does not specifically include allegations of sexual
violence, the preliminary indictment (which was published online but
never filed due to the trip's cancellation) does mention forced nudity
and sexual humiliation as facts underlying the torture allegations. 270
Although the U.S. government has repeatedly painted the abuse
of detainees as "the work of a few rogue soldiers deserving of punish-
ment,"271 efforts such as the drafting of the complaint mentioned
above reflect the international community's expanding recognition of
the use of sexual violence as more than mere ad hoc abuse. Indeed,
such abuse is increasingly being acknowledged as a deliberate tool of
war: a tool that has been implicitly and/or explicitly encouraged by
high-level military and government officials and employed systemati-
cally around the world.2 72 If the United States is to credibly join the
fight to combat war-related sexual violence and continue the advances
it so impressively began with its promulgation of the Lieber Code, it
will have to recognize and acknowledge use of that tool not only by
others but by itself.
267. See Letter from the Ctr. for Constitutional Rights et a]., to the Gen. Prosecutor of
the Canton of Geneva, Re: Letter of Denunciation in Support of the Two Complaints Filed
Against George W. Bush for Torture (Feb. 7, 2011), http://ccrjustice.org/files/Updated
%20Bush%20Denunciation%2OLetter%207%20Feb%202011%2OEnglish%20.pdf.
268. Id.
269. Devin Dwyer, George W Bush Cans Swiss Tzp as Groups Promise Prosecution for War
Crimes, ABC NEWS (Feb. 7, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/george-bush-cancels-
swiss-trip-rights-activists-vow/story?id=12857195.
270. CTR. FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, PREUMINARY INDICTMENT FOR TORTURE: GEORGE
W. BUSH BROUGHT PURSUANT TO THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE 13 (Feb. 7, 2011).
271. Rumann, supra note 2, at 273.
272. Id. at 274, 278.
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